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INTRODUCTION
The telecommunications industry is undergoing a technological
revolution which promises to radically change the way people commu-
nicate. Industry participants are increasingly aware that the tradi-
tional view of telecommunications-of a telephone transmitting voice
and data communications to a fixed location-is antiquated.' Since
its introduction to the market eleven years ago, cellular technology
has captured the imaginations of consumers and industry strategists
alike, but the technology is only now beginning to match the imagina-
tive forces behind it.2 Combining this technology with video and in-
teractive services, communications firms of the future will have the
capability to provide broadband services on an anywhere, anytime ba-
sis.3 As new technologies begin to unfold, however, the current tele-
communications regulatory scheme faces a serious threat.
The communications industry, primarily in the areas of telecom-
munications, cable television, and studio entertainment, is presently
one of the most active merger and acquisition markets.4 This consoli-
dation is fueled by an increasing understanding of the interactive ca-
pabilities of these once discreet forms of communication. 5 Within
1 SeeJane A. Strachan, Untangling the Regulatory and Legal Wires to Telephone and Cable
Television Technology, 11 U. BrUDGEPORT L REV. 599 (1991) (transmission of voice, data, and
video communications to the home over a single wire feasible); Dan Margiotta, Wireless
Fixed Loop Access: The Bridge to the Information Age, TELEPHONY, Aug. 2, 1993, at 20, 26 (field
testing has shown wireless transmission can be a cost effective alternative to wired local
access).
2 See infra part II.B.1.
3 See Communications: PoliH-Makers Expected To Remove Many Regulatory Barriers, Daily
Rep. For Execs. (BNA) Outlook '94, Jan. 28, 1994, at 18 [hereinafter Communications: Pol-
icy-Makers] (observing that the Clinton administration has taken a strong stand on paving
the way for the "information superhighway," a vital aspect of which is the continued devel-
opment of broadband interactive telecommunications).
4 Erin M. Reilly, The Telecommunications Industry in 1993: The Year of the MeAger, 2
COMMONLAW CONSPECTUS 95, 103 (1994).
5 Until recently, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) banned the Re-
gional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) from owning or controlling any cable or broad-
cast television facility. FCC regulations still require separation of video transmission from
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this larger context, the telecommunications industry is undergoing its
own technological changes, driven primarily by the influx of wireless
communications in the local sector and fiber optic cable in the long
distance sector.6 Consequently, the regulatory challenge for the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) is twofold: first, to update
the present regulatory scheme to accommodate fast paced technologi-
cal changes and integration, and second, to protect the social welfare
goals that justify the FCC's regulatory presence. These social welfare
concerns have traditionally included maximizing the overall quality
and convenience of telecommunications, maximizing the availability
and affordability of telecommunications services, and protecting the
national security interests in maintaining the integrity of the telecom-
munications networks. 7
Many have heralded the 1982 breakup of the Bell System8 as a
testament to the ability of the regulatory process to supplement the
free market for the betterment of society.9 This observation is poten-
tially misleading, however, because in the wake of the American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co.. (AT&T) antitrust litigation, the FCC, the
Department ofJustice, Congress, and the federal courts have assumed
enormous responsibility for regulating telecommunications. The Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia had the luxury of time when it
restructured a nearly static industry monopoly;' 0 Judge Harold
voice and data transmission in the interest of maintaining the viability of cable television
firms which would be at risk if the local Operating Companies were to enter the market
directly. However, the courts recently invalidated the FCC's cross ownership ban on consti-
tutional grounds, and bills have been introduced in Congress that would, inter alia, con-
firm this ruling (H.R. 3636 and 1504), and, in at least one other case, would allow cable
and telephone operators to offer broadband services (S. 1086). In addition, the Clinton
administration is currently working on proposed legislation that would remove all impedi-
ments to the creation of interactive broadband communications necessary to complete the
information superhighway. This includes removal of the cross ownership ban and the im-
posed separation of mass media video communications. Communications: Policy-Makers,
supra note 3; Strachan, supra note 1, at 601-02. For a discussion of alternative methods of
deterring the anticompetitive abuses associated with the lifting of structural separation re-
quirements, see Warren G. Lavey, Ending Structural Separation For Telephone Companies, 18
CoNN. L. REv. 81, 109-12 (1985).
6 See MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMumICATIONS LAw 1-7, 68-81
(Supp. 1993).
7 See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
8 For a summary of the antitrust litigation leading to the breakup of the Bell System,
see infra part I.A.2; see also United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.G. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
9 See, e.g., Paul Carranza & Colleen M. McElroy, A Decade of Revolution in Telecommuni-
cations; Breakup of AT&T Brought Lower Prices, New Services, Vast Potentia BuFF. NEws, Jan. 1,
1994, at 13 (business section); Leslie Helm, Talk Is Cheap, and Now Bells'Future Is Rich, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 25, 1993, at Al; Kathleen Killette, A Decade Later, Users Are Big Winners-Divesti-
ture Gave Users New Freedom, COMMUNCATIONSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1992, at 1; John Zeglis, John
Zeglis-Senior Vice President/General Counsel AT&T, COMMUaCATIoNsWEE Jan. 3, 1994, at 21
(special section).
10 See infra part LA2.
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Greene took almost three years to approve a workable remedy, and
over a year to implement that remedy."
The FCC, Congress, the federal courts; and the Justice Depart-
ment, on the other hand, currently preside over a quasi-competitive
industry that is undergoing drastic changes. 12 These entities are faced
with a far different task than that faced by Judge Greene when he
presided over the antitrust litigation that resulted in the Modified Fi-
nal Judgment (MFJ), which remains in effect to the present. The MFJ
set the stage for; competition, but other government institutions have
since been responsible for encouraging and maintaining a competi-
tive and socially optimal telecommunications market in a rapidly
changing environment. Their ability to perform this task is highly
suspect.
The district courts' continuing role in the regulatory process is
typical of antitrust consent decrees, which tend to place courts in the
role of de facto regulatory agencies.' 3 The district courts' regulatory
role in enforcing the MFJ is not easily reconciled with the role it
played in bringing about the MFJ. The courts' initial role was reactive,
its purpose being to undo an undesirable monopoly brought about by
unchecked market imperfections. In contrast, the post-Decree regula-
tory role of the federal courts, the FCC, and the Justice Department is
proactive-their objective is to manage behavior in the telecommuni-
cations industry to fulfill long-term social and market objectives.
Whereas the FCC fulfills its obligation by promulgating flexible rules,
regulations, and procedures, the district court fulfills its regulatory
function by enforcing the thirteen-year-old MFJ, which is based on the
industry as it existed in 1982. As a preliminary matter, this Note ar-
gues that the MFJ, while useful in restructuring the industry in 1984, is
fundamentally flawed for the purpose of regulating the industry as it
exists today.
Moreover, the district courts' role in regulating the telecommuni-
cations industry has been the source of tremendous confusion be-
ll For details related to the history and logistics of the AT&T antitrust litigation, see
infra part IA2; see also AT&, 552 F. Supp. at 135-47.
12 The role thatJudge Greene of the District Court of the District of Columbia cur-
rently plays centers on AT&T and the seven Regional BOCs spun off from AT&T after the
breakup. The district court retained substantial oversight powers as part of the resulting
Consent Decree. Under the Modified FinalJudgment (MFJ), the court retains authority to
determine what activities carried on by AT&T and the BOCs threaten the antitrust restric-
tions contained in the MFJ. To date, Judge Greene has restricted the BOGs to a greater
extent than the FCC has restricted other telecommunications companies not subject to the
district court's authority under the MFJ. While the vast majority of the MFJ's restrictions
focus on the BOCs, AT&T was a party to the MFJ and is subject to the district court's
rulings. MCI, Sprint, and other telecommunications firms are not subject to the MFJ or
the court's rulings under the MFJ. See Paul Schreiber, Shots Ring Out In Telecommunications
War, NEWSDAY, Feb. 14, 1989, at 41.
13 KELLOGG Er Al., supra note 6, at 37.
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cause it has resulted in a two-tiered regulatory process involving both
the courts and the FCC.14 In addition, technological advances over
the past thirteen years have undermined the most critical foundations
of the MFJ, making it an improper basis for controlling the activities
of the industry.15 The district court is also an extremely inefficient
arena in which to regulate the industry because it cannot act unilater-
ally to effect changes, but rather can provide only 'yes' or 'no' answers
to petitions filed under the hopelessly obsolete MFJ.16 With a backlog
as long as two or three years, petitions are often long out-of-date
before they are ever considered by the court.
17
To address these concerns, the Federal Communications Act of
193418 must be updated. The Communications Act is the primary.
piece of legislation governing the telecommunications industry and
has undergone surprisingly few amendments since its enactment over
60 years ago. Congress has left the courts to interpret its provisions in
a rapidly changing environment without meaningful legislative clarifi-
cation. 19 Part II of this Note argues that Congress must take a more
active role in directing this regulatory scheme. It also observes, how-
ever, that pending legislation 20 displays a lack of understanding of the
competitive issues at hand and presents a flawed solution for getting
regulation of the industry out of the courts and into the hands of FCC
regulators.
2'
The principal debate involves the increasing vulnerability of the
local access monopolies created after the breakup of AT&T. Though
still largely intact, these monopolies are on the verge of disintegra-
tion, drastically altering the perceived balance of power.22 New devel-
14 See infra notes 115-31 and accompanying text (observing that the MFJ has created a
two-tiered regulatory scheme for AT&T and the BOCs, while noting that other competitors
are not subject to the district court's enforcement authority).
15 See KELLOGG Er AL, supra note 6, at 4-7; see also Sanford V. Berg, Telecommunications:
Balancing Regulation and the Marketplace PUB. U-n. FoRTMNGHTLY, May 15, 1993, at 15. For a
discussion of the types of services likely to become available and the effect such services
might have on the legal profession, see RandolphJ. Burkart, Cellular Technology May Trans-
form Practice, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at S19.
16 See Four Bells Harmonize on Call for Consent Decree's End, FCC REP., July 14, 1994.
17 Id.
18 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
19 See Communications: Polic-Makers, supra note 3, at 18.
20 See S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
21 See generaly Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division Anne K. Bingaman, Testi-
mony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business
Rights (Sept. 20, 1994), in Fed. Document Clearinghouse Cong. Testimony, Sept. 20, 1994. Ms.
Bingaman testified on behalf of the Clinton administration in support of the legislation.
Her testimony evidences many of the misperceptions that will continue to hold the indus
try and the public captive to the courts as they begin the long process of interpreting the
unnecessarily complex tests and structural safeguards proposed in this bill.
22 SeeJohn Eckhouse, Marketplace Bypasses Phone Ruling, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 18, 1993, at
Cl; Nancy Hass, The Solomon Solution, FIN. WORLD, Oct. 12, 1993, at 32. Field testing has
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opments in wireless communications and recognition of the benefits
of broadband service require radical changes in the competitive struc-
ture established by the 1982 MFJ,23 which continues to structurally
separate the Regional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) from the
quasi-competitive long distance and equipment manufacturing sec-
tors. To accommodate new technological developments and to en-
courage the competition that they facilitate, the regulatory structure
will need not only to accommodate and encourage competition in the
local access sector, but to expand it in the long distance and equip-
ment sectors. 24 Ironically, the former may be easier than the latter.2 5
In August of 1993, the magnitude of the problem facing FCC reg-
ulators and congressional policymakers hit home when AT&T an-
nounced its $12.6 billion acquisition of McCaw Cellular
Communications, the nation's largest cellular provider.26 The merger
announcement demonstrated the precarious position of competitors
in all facets of telecommunications, particularly that of the BOCs spun
off from AT&T following the 1982 antitrust action. The real signifi-
cance of the merger lies in the potential for AT&T to connect calls
directly from its cellular networks to its own long distance lines,
thereby bypassing the wired local networks.
The BOCs also face competition in the local access market from
cable television companies that have the capacity to use their cable
television networks as broadband local exchange networks. 27 Until re-
cently, the Cable Communications Policy Act of 198428 legislatively
prohibited any BOC from providing video programming in its area of
telephone service,29 but this prohibition was judicially attacked in
Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States,30 which declared
the Act's cross-ownership ban unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds.
AT&T's emergence at the forefront of wired local access bypass
technology3' and the entrance of cable television companies into tele-
already demonstrated that current wireless technology will soon present a cost effective
substitute for wired local access. Margiotta, supra note 1, at 20.
23 See Communications: White House to Move Forward on Pledge to Create High-Level Commu-
nications Link Daily Rep. For Execs. (BNA), Sept. 2, 1993, at A169.
24 See Communications: Policy-Makers, supra note 3, at 18.
25 See infra part II.B.2.
26 For an expression of the early fears associated with the AT&T-McCaw merger, see
Michael Botein, TheAT&T-McCaw Merger Need ForAnalysis, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 30, 1993, at 2; see
also Eckhouse, supra note 22, at C1.
27 See Strachan, supra note 1, at 603.
28 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988).
29 47 U.S.C. § 533(b) (1988).
80 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), affd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994).
31 See AT&T Goes Cellular in Merger Acquires McCaw in $12.6 Billion Dea, PLAIN DEALER,
Aug. 17, 1993, at IF.
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communications3 2 will significantly hasten the erosion of the local ex-
change monopolies currently held by the BOCs. In addition,
competitive access providers (CAPs) have installed unregulated fiber
optic local networks in the nation's largest commercial centers. This
enables them to lure the business of large commercial telephone
users away from the BOCs, cherry picking the best local customers
who generate sixty to seventy percent of BOC revenues.33 The erosion
of the local exchange monopolies provides an opportunity to escape
the remaining vestiges of monopoly control in the industry. However,
it also signifies an end to the predictable regulatory environment cre-
ated by monopoly control of the local access sector3 4
This Note argues that to facilitate a competitive telecommunica-
tions industry, the regulatory scheme must deemphasize the increas-
ingly misplaced monopoly concerns of operating efficiency and price
gouging in the local access sector. Instead, it must concentrate pri-
marily on streamlining the regulatory process,3 5 encouraging techno-
logical progress, keeping core services affordable, and protecting the
integrity of telecommunications networks.36
This Note envisions a regulatory scheme that facilitates the great-
est possible number of full service telecommunications providers.
This view contrasts sharply with the current regulatory scheme, which
structurally separates various submarkets within the industry. More-
over, this Note disagrees with legislation proposed in Congress, which,
32 See supra note 5; see also Survey Telecommunications, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 1993 (spe-
cial section), at 12-13 [hereinafter EcoNOMusT].
33 See News Conferene with BellAtlanti, Bell South, Nynex and Southwestern Bell FED. NEWS
SERVICE, July 6, 1994 [hereinafter News Conference].
34 The local access sector of the telecommunications industry traditionally has been
considered a natural monopoly because of the high capital costs of entry and sharply de-
clining long-run average costs. See generaly W. BOLTER, TE.ECOMMUNICATIONS PoaY FOR
THE 1990's AND BEYOND 32-45 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regula-
tion, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969). Government regulation of natural monopolies is usually
based on a set rate of return on capital. In the case of telecommunications, the objective is
to set local access prices at a level that reflects the costs plus the set rate of return that
would exist in a competitive market. This theoretically results in a competitive cost of
capital for local access providers by eliminating their advantage relative to other industries.
Rate-of-return regulation helps to minimize monopoly price gouging and to enforce some
minimal level of operating efficiency in the industry. If telecommunications is losing its
status as a natural monopoly-a proposition for which there is strong support, see S. C.
LrTTLECHILD, ELEMENTS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECoNOMICS 199-200 (1979), the effi-
ciency and price gouging justifications for regulating the industry in this manner will be
obsolete. See infta part H.D.3.
35 The Clinton administration favors legislative expansion of the FCC's regulatory au-
thority, while encouraging a more flexible regulatory policy within the Agency. See Commu-
nications: Policy-Makers, supra note 3.
36 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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among other things, would continue to legislatively enforce structural
separation of telecommunications markets.3 7
Part I of this Note outlines the history of the antitrust litigation
that brought about the breakup of the Bell System monopoly and
made the federal courts major participants in the regulatory scheme.
It then examines the emergence of cellular and broadband technolo-
gies and explains their basic function and regulatory significance.
Part II discusses the future impact of these technologies and the anti-
trust and public interest implications of their proliferation. In addi-
tion, it proposes some simple but necessary regulatory reforms.
Part II first proposes that Congress remove jurisdiction over the
1982 MFJ from the federal courts and place full regulatory control
with the FCC.38 This would centralize and streamline the regulatory
process, thereby permitting the FCC to respond quickly to the chang-
ing competitive environment, further reducing the cost to the indus-
try and consumers of regulatory delay.
Part II then proposes eliminating the line-of-business restrictions
imposed on the BOCs by the MFJ.3 9 This reform would permit the
BOCs to become full service telecommunications providers capable of
competing with the likes of AT&T in the full service local, broadband,
and long distance markets. It would also help-eliminate the litigation
stranglehold that continues to retard industry progress.4° As an inci-
dent to the removal of the line-of-business restrictions, the system of
area boundaries established by the MFJ should be dispensed with,
leaving the local operating companies and their competitors to oper-
ate their local networks according to principles of efficiency.41
Finally, Part II urges the complete elimination of rate-of-return
pricing in the industry and the continued replacement of this pricing
system with a system of price caps42 that reflect the current average
37 See Bingarnan, supra note 21; J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications: The Big Picture,
RoLL CALL, June 27, 1994.
38 Senator Bob Dole introduced such a bill during the 1985-86 legislative term. Rich-
ard E. Wiley, The End of Monopoly: Regulatory Change and the Promotion of Competition, in
TEucoMMUNICArIONS AND THE LAW 147, 169 (Walter Sapronov ed., 1988). The bill was
not passed, but political support for such a measure is far greater now than it was ten years
ago. Technological developments over the ensuing years, as well as the Clinton administra-
tion's support for such a move, are improving the bill's chances for success.
39 See infra part Il.D.1.
40 This is one of the major shortfalls of the current Senate Bill 1822. It contains so
many prophylactic tests and structural safeguards that it is certain to spend the foreseeable
future bogged down in litigation to interpret the meaning of the tests and safeguards. A
clear and concise end to the line-of-business restrictions requires less interpretation and
facilitates the use of more efficient measures to prevent anticompetitive activity. See infra
part I.D.1.
41 See News Conference, supra note 33.
42 Price caps on core services will ensure availability of basic core services for individ-
ual users, but will not create the kinds of problems caused by rate-of-return pricing. Price
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cost to the local service providers. This would allow prices to better
reflect emerging competitive trends, encourage new technological de-




A. The Current Regulatory Scheme: The Federal
Communications Act of 1934 and the AT&T Antitrust
Litigation
1. Federal Communications Act of 1934
The Federal Communications Act of 193444 is the sole source of
national telecommunications policy. It has undergone little revision
since its enactment over sixty years ago, and there is mounting need
for Congress to establish updated communications policies that.better
reflect the industry's current technological environment. 45 Telecom-
munications is presently the largest industry in the United States, and
caps on core services will allow the BOCs and other local service providers to keep profits
derived from increased efficiencies in providing local services. At the same time, prices for
core local services may be forced down by increased competition in that sector. In addi-
tion, the market would be free to determine the prices for new, more technologically ad-
vanced services. In this way, firms would have greater incentives to maximize efficiency
gains because they would be free to reinvest or to distribute to investors any additional
returns, as opposed to having to include efficiency returns into their future rate-of-return
calculations. The risk to investors would increase because of the lack of a guaranteed re-
turn, but so would the potential gain. Dennis Patrick, FCC Chairman during the first half
of the Bush administration, supported the price cap alternative, which was the subject of
an FCC initiative widely implemented in the interstate sector. See infra part ll.D.4; see also
Amendment of Part 65 and 69 of the Commission's Rules to Reform the Interstate Rate of
Return Representation and Enforcement Processes, 7 F.C.C. Rec. 4688 (1992); Schreiber,
supra note 12, at 41. The FCC has phased out rate-of-return regulation in the long distance
market and the results have been promising, but a complete shift is needed to attain the
full benefits from such action. See News Conference, supra note 33. For additional discussion
of the price cap alternative, see Berg, supra note 15, at 16-17.
According to the D.C. Circuit, full detariffing of telecommunications firms will require
legislative amendment to the Communications Act of 1934. In AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727
(D.C. Cir. 1992) the court ruled that the FCC did not have authority to eliminate the
requirement under § 203(a) of the Communications Act that all carriers file their prices
with the FCC. The court reached this conclusion despite language in § 203(b) (2) which
grants the Commission power to "modify any requirement [of the section] in particular
instances or by general order applicable to special circumstances or conditions."
43 Rate-of-return pricing tends to stifle technological development because it sets
prices based on the industry's costs plus a reasonable rate of return for investors. In peri-
ods of fast paced technological innovation, the depreciation rate increases dramatically,
causing firms to charge high prices for services in order to provide the set rate of return to
investors. High initial prices exclude many marginal users from the market for new serv-
ices, reducing market penetration and long-term gains from investing in the new technol-
ogy. See Berg, supra note 15, at 16-17.
44 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-613 (1988).
45 See Kirk Victor, Road Warriors, NAT'L LJ., Mar. 20, 1993, at 680.
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its growth and development are of vital importance to our national
economy.46 Yet, until recently, Congress has given this issue very little
attention.
The most important feature of the Communications Act is its es-
tablishment of the FCC. Pursuant to the Act, the FCC maintains regu-
latory authority over all interstate and foreign wire and radio
communications formerly regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission.47 The FCC's delegated authority is broad and compre-
hensive.48 The FCC has rule-making authority, and all rules and regu-
lations promulgated by the FCC have the binding force and effect of
law so long as they are consistent with the Communications Act.
49
2. AT&T Antitrust Litigation
Prior to January 1, 1984, AT&T was both the largest company5°
and the largest monopoly in the world.51 The combined operations
of AT&T, known as the Bell System, exercised monopoly power over
nearly every sector of the telecommunications industry within the
United States. The most important of these sectors included long dis-
tance service, provided by the Long Lines division; local communica-
tions networks, maintained exclusively by the Bell Operating
Companies (BOCs); and telecommunications equipment manufactur-
ing and leasing, carried on almost exclusively by AT&T's Western
Electric division. 52
The Bell System's antitrust problems began in 1949, when the
Justice Department first acted to end *the anticompetitive equipment
manufacturing and leasing activity of Western Electric. 53 The govern-
ment alleged "that the defendants had monopolized and conspired to
restrain trade in the manufacture, distribution, sale, and installation
of telephones, telephone apparatus, equipment, materials, and sup-
plies, in violation of sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Antitrust
AcL"
5 4
46 See Karen Dillon, Raw Power, AM. LAw., Sept. 1994, at 69.
47 47 U.S.C. § 151.
48 See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1968).
49 Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 98 F.2d 282, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1938), cert. denied
305 U.S. 625 (1939).
50 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 151-52 & n.85 (D.D.C. 1982), affid sub
noma. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). For a detailed account of AT&T's
predivestment size and organizations, see SoNNY KLEFm1D, THE BIGGESr CoMPNY ON
EARTH 3-12 (1981). In 1980, the Bell System's operating revenues exceeded $50 billion-
almost 2% of the gross national product of the United States. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152
n.85.
51 KLEINFIELD, supra note 50.
52 See id. at 5-6.
53 The case was originally filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of NewJersey
against the Western Electric Company and AT&T. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 135.
54 Id. at 135-36; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
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The Western Electric suit was virtually inactive between 1949 and
the filing of a consent decree in 1956.55 The 1956 Consent Decree
was far less ambitious than the relief initially sought by the govern-
ment, which had included structural adjustments, such as divestiture
of Western Electric by AT&T. 56 AT&T successfully exercised its polit-
ical influence with the Department of Defense, which argued that a
forced divestiture of Western Electric would "effectively disintegrate
the coordinated organization which is fundamental to the successful
carrying forward of [a number of] critical defense projects, [and
would] be contrary to the vital interests of the nation."57 The District
Court for the District of NewJersey found the 1956 Consent Decree to
be in the public interest and approved the Decree,58 despite the fact
that it required absolutely no structural changes within the Bell Sys-
tem and was virtually useless in restraining AT&T's exercise of its an-
ticompetitive capabilities. 59
On November 20, 1974, the government filed a second antitrust
action against AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell Telephone Laborato-
ries 60 in the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia.61 The complaint alleged that AT&T had monopolized a broad
range of telecommunications services and equipment markets in viola-
55 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 136.
56 Id.
57 ANTITRUST SuBcomM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., lsr
SEss., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OFJUSTICE 56 (Comm. Print
1959).
58 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 138. Subject to the requirements of the Tunney Act, 15
U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1988), antitrust consent decrees must be approved by a court. The
Tunney Act requires that the approval procedure culminate in a finding by the court that
the Decree is "in the public interest." In determining whether a consent decree is in the
public interest, courts look to the principles and goals of the antitrust law, which Congress
enacted to "preserv[e] free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." AT&T, 552
F. Supp. at 149 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)).
59 The sole remedy the 1956 Consent Decree provided was an injunction that
precluded AT&T from engaging in any business other than the provision of
common carrier communications services; precluded Western Electric from
manufacturing equipment other than that used by the Bell System; re-
quired the defendants to license their patents to all applicants upon the
payment of appropriate royalties.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 138.
60 Bell Labs is the research and development subsidiary of AT&T. It was, and still is,
one of the premier research laboratories in the world, having discovered such technologies
as the laser, the transistor, and the optical computer. AMERICAN TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH
Co., 1992 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1993).
61 CA No. 74-1698. According to the Competitive Impact Statement filed in connec-
tion with the 1982 MFJ, the government initiated this action because
the 1956 consent decree was not adequate to prevent activities that unrea-
sonably restrained competition in telecommunications equipment markets,
and did not protect against antitrust violations in the intercity telecommu-
nications field.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139 n.18; Competitive Impact Statement, 47 Fed. Reg. 7170 (1982).
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tion of section two of the Sherman Act.62 The government sought the
divestiture of the BOCs and dissolution of Western Electric.
63
The case eventually went to trial onJanuary 15, 1981. InJanuary,
1982 the parties proposed a Consent Decree.6 Judge Harold
Greene's Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) subsequently approved this
Decree with some modifications. 65 In contrast to the 1956 Consent
Decree, the 1982 MFJ required radical structural changes in AT&T.66
a. Divestiture of the Bell Operating Companies
The 1982 MFJ mandated AT&T's total divestiture of the BOCs.
The rationale behind this divestiture was that without control of ac-
cess to the local operating networks, AT&T would be incapable of ex-
ercising monopoly control over the long distance and equipment
markets.
6 7
Prior to January 1, 1984, the day the MFJ took effect and the
BOCs were divested, AT&T had successfully frustrated competitors' at-
tempts to provide competitive long distance service and telecommuni-
cations equipment by making access to local networks prohibitively
difficult. 68 In the long distance market, for example, customers of
competing carriers were required to dial significantly more numbers
to obtain network access than users of AT&T long distance. 69 AT&T
also refused to provide a number of specialized local services to pur-
chasers of competing long distance service.70 In addition, evidence
62 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 139.
63 1&
64 The MFJ was actually submitted to the District Court for the District of NewJersey,
as an amendment to the Consent Decree entered by the parties in 1956. The parties then
sought to dismiss the District of Columbia action. Id. at 140-41. This was designed to
prevent the parties from having to comply with the requirements of the Tunney Act, which
is applicable to all antitrust consent decrees, but arguably not to subsequent modifications
of decrees. See id. at 144 & n.51. The D.C. district court, however, refused to dismiss the
case on the grounds that the proposed 1982 Consent Decree was more than a simple modi-
fication of the 1956 Decree and that a dismissal would be contrary to the purpose and
intent of the Tunney Act. The NewJersey Western Electric case was transferred to the D.C.
court and the Consent Decree was considered by the court in accordance with the require-
ments of the Tunney Act. See id. at 143-45. For a more detailed discussion of the Tunney
Act's requirements, see iU at 148-44.
65 Id at 225.
66 For a more detailed description and analysis of the decree requirements, see id at
160-95.
67 See id. at 160-70.
68 See id. at 161-63.
69 See BRIDGER M. MrrcHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THE-
ORY AND PRAcriCE 166-67 (1991).
70 Services denied to customers of competing carriers included foreign exchange ser-
vice, which provides a dedicated line from the customer's location to a telephone switching
system in a distant location, and common control switching arrangements, which are ex-
tensive local systems designed to network very large individual customers. For more de-
tailed analysis of these discriminatory practices, see AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161 n.124.
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showed that AT&T used monopoly profits from its local access opera-
tions to subsidize its long distance rates.7' These practices made it
virtually impossible for other potential long distance carriers to
compete.
Within the equipment manufacturing market, AT&T successfully
deterred entry by creating monopoly-based incentives to prevent cus-
tomers from purchasing competing equipment.72 For example,
AT&T maintained strict connection restrictions under the guise of
protecting the network from faulty or substandard equipment.7 The
restrictions prohibited all competing equipment from connecting
with the network except through a protective connecting arrange-
ment (PCA).74 In its Final Judgment, the court noted that
AT&T required PGAs for equipment that in all probability could
not harm the network; that there were delays in providing PCAs;
that the PCAs were over-designed and over-engineered, and, thus,
over-priced; [and] that PCAs were required for competitive equip-
ment while identical equipment sold by AT&T did not require their
use.75
AT&T's control of the local Operating Companies was central to its
ability to carry on this anticompetitive activity.
As a result of the forced divestiture of the twenty-two BOCs, 76 lo-
cal service became the domain of the seven surviving independent
BOCs, 77 each possessing a monopoly over several local networks,
otherwise known as "exchange areas" or "local access and transport
areas" (LATAs).78 The exchange areas were designed to be "large
enough to comprehend contiguous areas having common social and
71 Id. at 223.
72 Id. at 162-63. For a more thorough discussion of cross subsidization in the telecom-
munications industry, see Warren G. Lavey and Dennis W. Carlton, Economic Goals and
Remedies of the AT&T Modified FinalJudgment, 71 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1508-12 (1982).
73 See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 162-63. For an account of potential threats that AT&T
alleged unrestricted attachment of competing equipment would pose, see id, at 162 n.133.
74 Id. at 162. The FCC mandated the use of certifications as a replacement for PCAs
prior to 1982. Competitors could obtain certification of their non-Bell equipment and
attach it directly to the network as long as the equipment met established technical stan-
dards. Although not long in use before the 1982 Decree, no damage could be attributed
to the network resulting from the use of certification in place of PCAs. Id. at 163 & nn.135-
36.
75 Id. at 162-63.
76 After the divestiture, only seven local Operating Companies remained, each pos-
sessing a monopoly over local wired access within that exchange area.
77 The seven remaining BOCs provide local service to the 164 local access and trans-
port areas (LATAs) created by the reorganization. See United States v. AT&T, 569 F. Supp.
990 (D.D.C. 1983) (LATA Opinion). Each local Operating Company encompasses several
LATAs, but is authorized to transmit telecommunications information only between points
within a single LATA. See id.; see also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231,
1233 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1363 (1993).
78 Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. at 990.
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economic characteristics but not so large as to defeat the intent of the
decree to separate the provision of intercity services from the provi-
sion of local exchange service." 79 The MFJ, therefore, accomplished
precisely what the 1956 Decree had failed to do-impose structural
changes in the Bell System that impaired AT&T's ability to stifle com-
petition in telecommunications markets.
Central to the MFJ's rationale was the fact that in 1982 the local
Operating Companies were functioning as bottlenecks. The only way
a user could access long distance communications was through the
local networks, and thus all user premises telephone equipment had
to be connected to the local network. Establishing competing local
networks was not a viable option because of the high capital costs of
building local networks and the sharply declining long-run average
cost of operating them.8 0 The local networks were textbook examples
of natural monopolies. 81 However, other sectors of the industry-the
long distance and equipment sectors in particular-were potentially
competitive if access to local networks could be achieved on an equal
basis.8 2
b. Elimination of Line-of-Business Restrictions on AT&T
As a further modification to the 1956 Decree, the district court
eliminated all restrictions on AT&T's entrance into markets other
than common carrier telecommunications.83 As the court noted,
[t]he antitrust laws do not require that a company be prohibited
from competing in a market unless it can be demonstrated that its
participation in that market will have anticompetitive effects. Past
restrictions on AT&T were justified primarily because of its control
over the local Operating Companies .. . [and] continued restric-
tions are not required unless justified by some other rationale.
8 4
Of particular significance was the court's handling, of requests by
several policymakers, including the members of the House Telecom-
munications Subcommittee of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 85 that AT&T be restricted from participating in the re-
search, development, and operation of local network bypass technol-
79 Competitive Impact Statement, supra note 61, at 7170.
80 See supra note 34.
81 See supra note 34.
82 But see infra part 1I.B.2.
83 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 181, 178-79 (D.D.C. 1982), af/d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The court did impose a seven-year ban
on AT&T's entering the electronic publishing business. Id. at 186. For a detailed discus-
sion of the Court's rationale for imposing the electronic publishing restriction, see id. at
180-86.
84 d. at 170.
85 On July 27, 1982, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
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ogy.8 6 Despite recognition of the potential for bypass technology to
render the Operating Companies obsolete, the court rejected this
restriction.
8 7
Judge Greene reasoned that such a restriction would be appropri-
ate "only if two premises were accepted: (1) that if AT&T does not
develop the technology required for bypass, it will not be developed
by anyone, and (2) that it is desirable as a matter of public policy to
curtail this technological development. "88 The court rejected both of
these premises, holding that it was antithetical to the policies underly-
ing antitrust law to prohibit AT&T from developing a competitive sub-
stitute for the monopolies still controlling wired local exchange.8 9
The court recognized that removing AT&T and Bell Laboratories
from participating in this development would certainly slow the emer-
gence of potentially beneficial technology.90
c. Line-of-Business Restrictions on the BOCs
To prevent a recurrence of the vertical control exercised by the
Bell System, the MFJ imposed substantial restrictions on the newly in-
dependent BOCs' ability to enter markets other than local exchange
telecommunications. 91 Such restrictions were considered necessary
because, although heavily regulated by the district court and the FCC,
the BOGs retained monopoly control over their respective local access
networks.92 This arrangement replaced the complete vertical monop-
olization of the industry with competitive long distance and equip-
ment sectors and monopolized local communications networks. A
substantially better, but certainly not optimal, competitive situation re-
sulted. Continued monopoly control of local access service still con-
and four of his colleagues, forwarded a letter with a number of recommendations to the
Court. Id. at 147 n.63; see also id. at 175 & n.184.
86 See id at 175-76. Bypass technology includes cellular telephones, which can com-
pete directly with wired local networks.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 175.
89 Id. at 175 & nn.186-87.
90 See id. at 175.
91 Id. at 186-94.
92 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 969 F.2d 1231, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 1363 (1993); see supra note 34. To create competition in this market would
require trenching a second set of copper cables throughout every population center in the
country, thereby doubling the capital investment in local networks and driving up long-run
average costs. This is theoretically inefficient because too much capital would be tied up in
copper cables. This analysis holds true, of course, only if the existing monopolies can be
effectively regulated so as to adequately restrict their inefficient exercise of monopoly
power. The existence of cable television networks which can double as telephone lines,
and the emergence of competitive access providers which service only dense commercial
markets threaten the traditional view of the local access market. See infra part II.B.l.c.
660 [Vol. 80:646
NOTE-TELECOMMUNICATIONS
flicts with the long standing public policy of "preserving free and
unfettered competition as the rule of trade."93
According to Section VIII(C) of the MFJ, the court can waive the
line-of-business restrictions imposed on the BOCs as applied to a par-
ticular BOC if the petitioning BOC can show that "there is no substan-
tial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede
competition in the market it seeks to enter."94 Subsequent decisions
have, however, expanded the requirements for waiver of the line-of-
business restrictions. When deciding whether to grant a waiver, the
court must take into account the public interest considerations under-
lying the MFJ.95 Such considerations include the protection of equal
access to local networks for long distance carriers and the mainte-
nance of quality telephone service. 96
To expedite the decisionmaking process on proposed exceptions
to the line-of-business restrictions, the court established general
guidelines for the expansion of the BOCs into other markets. Four
safeguards were deemed necessary to effect the MFJ's objectives: 1)
the establishment of separate subsidiaries to carry out the new line of
business; 2) independent financing of the new line of business by the
subsidiary without recourse to the parent BOC's assets in the event of
default; 3) an agreement that the MIJ's monitoring provisions will ap-
ply to the proposed competitive activities; and 4) the estimated reve-
nues from the proposed activities may not exceed ten percent of the
BOC's total estimated net revenues.97
In accordance with this procedure, the BOCs currently maintain
a presence in a number of markets outside the local wired telecommu-
nications market, most notably in the areas of cellular communica-
tions,98 wireless paging, and cable television.99 As full service
93 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
94 AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 231.
95 See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 858 (D.D.C. 1984)
(holding that in considering petitions for waiver of line-of-business restrictions, the court
will "take into account... the decree's fundamental principles and purposes").
96 IR. at 860-62.
97 Id. at 870-72. The 10%-of-net-revenues limitation primarily ensures that the BOCs
will not neglect their primary function-to provide high quality, low cost local telephone
service. Id- at 871.
98 Because of the scarcity of frequencies available for wireless telecommunications,
the FCC allotted broadcasting licenses to only two cellular operators in each service area.
One license was in all cases granted to the BOC in each region. See infra notes 114-18 and
accompanying text.
99 The BOCs have been actively purchasing cable television networks around the
country to facilitate the emergence of telephone-television interactive services. The most
formidable of the recently proposed mergers was that of Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communi-
cations Inc. (TCI). TCI is the world's largest cable television systems operation, and the
$21.4 billion merger would have been the largest in media history. SeeJohn Greenwald,
Wired! Bell Atlantic's Bid for Cable Giant TCI is the Biggest Media Deal in History; It's Also a Peek
at theFuture, TiME, Oct. 25, 1993, at 50. The deal subsequently fell through when Congress
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telecommunications emerges as the future of the industry, however,
the BOCs are hindered by their inability to operate long distance lines
or to form strategic alliances with other long distance carriers, 00 as
well as their inability to combine cable television and telephone oper-
ations under a single corporate structure or to engage in the develop-
ment, manufacture, or sale of telephone equipment. Faced with
losing their local monopoly niche, they are severely restricted from
restructuring their operations to compete effectively in a full service
market.
B. Wireless Communications Under the Current Regulatory
Scheme
Not surprisingly, wireless telecommunications technology was
first developed by Bell Laboratories' 0 ' in 1946.102 This technology is
only recently coming of age as a viable alternative to wired local access
communications. 03 Understanding the current status of wireless
communications, both in terms of the technology and the competitive
positions of the major suppliers of cellular phone service, is a vital first
step in assessing its regulatory significance.
04
1. Technological Aspects of Wireless Communications
Wireless telecommunications are transmitted through a cell net-
work, which is composed of a series of adjacent hexagonal-shaped
"cells." Each cell contains a radio transceiver that transmits and re-
ceives signals within a relatively small geographic area. This cell struc-
ture is necessary to maximize the availability of wireless
telecommunications, which traditionally have been broadcast over a
very narrow band of available radio frequencies allotted to cellular
providers by the FCC.' 05 Cellular technology competes for a portion
mandated cable television rate cuts, but in theory, the economies still exist to make such a
deal profitable.
100 Chicago-based Ameritech has recently offered to throw open its local monopoly to
gain FCC permission to enter the long distance market. This quid pro quo approach sug-
gests the value to the BOCs in being allowed to operate full service companies. SeeJustin
Martin, Baby Bells Branch Out, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 1993, at 12.
101 See supra note 60.
102 See Philip McGuigan et al., Cellular Mobile Radio Telecommunications: Regulating an
Emerging Industry, 1983 B.Y.U. L. REv. 305, 307; see also ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 8.
103 ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 7.
104 For a thorough survey of cellular technology and its development, see GEoRGE CAL-
HouN, WnRFLiss Accss AND THE LocL TELEPHONE NETwoRK (1992).
105 Most cellular networks operate at frequencies of between 800 MHz (800 million
cycles per second) and 1 GHz (one billion cycles per second). The previously allotted
spectrum was somewhat stingy, forcing cellular engineers and physicists to devote tremen-
dous resources to developing new technologies to increase the volume of calls which could
be transmitted simultaneously on these frequencies. The cell structure itself has been the
primary means of accomplishing this objective, but other very promising technologies, cur-
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of the frequency spectrum with television, radio, microwave transmit-
ters, and other broadcasting mediums. The scarcity of available fre-
quencies has been one of the traditional limitations of cellular
communications, and many current technological advances are
geared toward increasing the volume of communications that can be
broadcast over the allotted frequencies.
06
Cells within current cellular networks have a radius of up to
twenty miles, depending on how much wireless traffic the network
supports. The smaller the cells within a network, the greater the
number of people who can operate cellular phones within that net-
work. In heavily populated areas, the cellular networks are composed
of relatively small cells, each with a radius of less than a mile. In more
rural areas cellular networks are likely to extend the full twenty miles
in radius. The increased capacity that results from shrinking the cells
is due to the network's ability to reuse available frequencies in
nonadjacent cells within the network.
Each transceiver within a cellular network is linked by wire or mi-
crowave transmission to a mobile transmission central switching office
(MTSO) .107 This central facility uses computer technology to coordi-
nate the cells within the network and is then interconnected to the
local wired telephone network. 0 8 To prevent termination of trans-
mission as a mobile unit passes from one cell to another (which in-
volves changing the frequency on which the call is transmitted), the
MTSO automatically reroutes the call through the new cell
transceiver.10 9
All but the most modem cellular networks employ analog tech-
nology to convert the human voice into a continuously varying electri-
cal signal, which is then transmitted along a frequency. 10 When this
signal is picked up by the transceiver within the originating cell, it is
passed on to the MTSO and then on to the wired local telephone
loop. Under the current regulatory scheme and employing the most
widely available technology, cellular networks are merely an extension
rently under development, promise to substantially increase the capacity of cellular net-
works. See ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 6-7. Moreover, the FCC recently auctioned a large
band of high frequency spectrum for broadband wireless communications. This will
greatly increase the availability of wireless communications and will serve as the corner-
stone for the widespread proliferation of wireless local access. See infra part H.B.I.b.
106 See infra part ll.B.l.a; see also CALHoUN, supra note 104, at 274-75.
107 See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643, 646 n.17 (D.D.C. 1993);
McGuigan et al., supra note 102, at 310.
108 See Western Elea, 578 F. Supp. at 646 n.17.
109 See McGuigan, et al., supra note 102, at 311.
110 See EcoNoMisr, supra note 32, at 7.
1995]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
of the traditional wired local network."' As will become evident, how-
ever, this is not likely to remain the case for very long.' 2
2. The Regulatory Environment of Wireless Communications
In contrast to wired local communications networks, cellular net-
works are not natural monopolies in the traditional sense. 113 Compe-
tition is limited more by the scarcity of frequencies available within
each service area than by the high capital costs of entry and sharply
declining long-run average costs associated with copper wire net-
works.114 To attract potential entrants into the cellular market, the
capacity of the networks-which determines potential revenues-
must be great enough to justify the expenses incurred in building the
networks. At the same time, competing cellular service providers
within the same geographic area cannot operate their networks on
overlapping frequencies. Thus, the capacity of cellular networks is in-
versely related to the number of competitors in each market.
In response to this limitation, the FCC, which is responsible for
allocating the frequency spectrum and establishing the geographic ar-
eas to be served by transmission," 5 granted operating licenses to only
two cellular providers within each cellular service area, known as a
standard metropolitan statistical area (SMSA).116 The FCC granted
one operator's license in each SMSA to the BOC providing local tele-
phone service in that area and issued the other by lottery to a
nonwireline carrier, known as a radio common carrier (RCC)," 7 that
submitted a viable proposal for building a cellular network in that
area." 8 Each service provider was then awarded one-half of the allot-
ted cellular frequencies.
The FCC's scheme for creating a viable, yet competitive cellular
communications market introduced a number of conflicts with sec-
tion II(D) of the MFJ, 1 9 which imposed the line-of-business restric-
tions on the BOCs. Specifically, the SMSA boundaries set by the FCC
111 See CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 126-32.
112 See infra part l.B.
113 See supra note 34. While the capital costs of building a cellular network are substan-
tial, the long-run average costs do not sharply decline. See ECONOMis, supra note 32, at 14;
CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 40-41.
114 See supra notes 98, 104-05 and accompanying text.
115 47 U.S.C. § 303(c), (d), (h) (1988).
116 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 578 F. Supp. 643, 646-47 nn.18-19 (D.D.C.
1983).
117 To ensure that the BOCs would not discriminate against competing mobile radio
systems in any material way, each BOC was required to offer nonwireline carriers access to
one local network "on the same terms and conditions," including quality and price of ac-
cess, that they provide to their own carriers. Id. at 651.
118 Id. at 646-47 n.18; McGuigan et al., supra note 102, at 315-17.
119 See supra part 1A.3.
664 [Vol. 80:646
NOTE-TELECOMMUNICATIONS
were not in all cases identical to the LATA boundaries set by the
court.' 20 Because of the need to maintain continuity in cellular net-
works, SMSAs often had to extend farther than the LATAs. For exam-
ple, New York City constitutes one LATA,121 but the corresponding
SMSA had to cover all of New York City and the surrounding metro-
politan area in order to meet consumer expectations that their trans-
missions would be continuous within that area. If the SMSAs
established by the FCC were to coincide strictly with the court's LATA
boundaries, the transmission of a mobile cellular caller leaving New
York City would be cut off. The caller would then have to reestablish
transmission through the next contiguous network. If the caller were
to then cross the Connecticut border into another LATA, transmis-
sion would be cut off a second time, and the caller would again have
to reestablish transmission through the next contiguous network.
1 22
This could have been a serious inconvenience, but it was easily over-
come by expanding the SMSA to encompass the entire New York City
metropolitan area.
In addition to the customer convenience issue, significant econo-
mies of scale are realized by linking large numbers of cells to a single
MTSO. Because of its complex function, the MTSO is the most costly
element of any cellular network.' 23 If a separate MTSO were required
for each individual LATA within a BOC's territory, the BOC would
face significant adverse economies relative to those incurred by the
RCCs.124
The problem presented by the differing LATA and SMSA bound-
aries is rooted in the dual regulatory relationship of the FCC and the
federal courts. The 1982 MFJ established the LATAs and specifically
restricts the BOCs from providing inter-LATA services. While operat-
ing a cellular network within a specific LATA is an approved "ex-
change service" within the meaning of section HI(D) (3) of the MFJ,'2
any portion of a BOC's system extending beyond the boundaries of a
single LATA is "interexchange telecommunication," 126 forbidden by
the MFJ. The SMSA boundaries, on the other hand, are established
by the FCC, which has a different set of regulatory priorities than that
120 See Western Ele., 578 F. Supp. at 648; see genera/ly United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983) (LATA opinion); see also supra notes 75-76 and accompany-
ing text.
121 See News Conference, supra note 83.
122 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 181, 229 (D.D.C. 1982) (MFJ § IV(G) (4)
states: "except with approval of the Court, no exchange area located in one State shall
include any point located within another State"), affid sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Western Ele., 578 F. Supp. at 648.
123 See Western E/ec., 578 F. Supp. at 648.49.
124 Id. at 649.
125 Id. at 645.
126 Id. at 645-46.
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of the federal courts. 127 Unlike the BOCs, the RCCs were not parties
to the MFJ and hence face no restrictions on their ability to operate
cellular networks as wide as the FCC will permit.128
Realizing that the BOCs would face a huge competitive disadvan-
tage vis-6-vis the RCCs if the court were to require strict compliance
with the MFJ, the district court, in accordance with section VIII(C) of
the MFJ, established market-specific exceptions to the inter-LATA
communication restriction of section II(D) (1).129 In a subsequent de-
cision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
it within the BOCs' purview to supply "exchange services" outside of
their own local service regions.'30 Together, these rulings permit the
BOCs to operate cellular networks contiguously throughout most of
the SMSAs and in the home territory of other BOCs, provided they
purchase one of the two operating licenses for the SMSA in that
region.' 3 '
Despite the complexity of the BOCs' regulatory environment,
traditional cellular networks operated by the BOCs are on an equal
footing with those of the RCCs with which they compete. Both face
the same geographic limits on their contiguous service areas, and
both may establish networks nationwide, provided they can procure
one of two operating licenses available for each of the 734 individual
SMSAs.13 2 However, these licenses are extremely expensive, explain-
ing in part why McCaw Communications, which used an acquisition
strategy to become the nation's largest cellular provider, was carrying
nearly $5 billion in debt when its proposed merger with AT&T was
announced.' 33
127 See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
128 Only AT&T and the BOCs are bound by the decisions of the district court because
they were parties to the 1982 Consent Decree. Other cellular, long distance, and manufac-
turing companies are not directly affected by the district court's rulings. See supra note 12.
129 Western Ele., 578 F. Supp. at 653. The court granted waivers for nine specific re-
gions in which the established SMSAs were larger than the corresponding LATAs. These
included, inter alia, New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore/Washington. Id.
at 647 n.20.
130 United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082, 1091-92 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987). This decision is of great importance not only because it allows
BOCs to operate cellular networks in competition with other BOCs but because it allows
BOCs to operate competing wired networks. Since cable television networks can easily be
updated to carry voice communications, combinations such as the failed Bell AtIantic-TCI
merger have tremendous competitive implications in light of the decision in Chesapeake &
Potomac Tele. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th
Cir. 1994). See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
131 Western Eec., 797 F.2d at 1091-92.
132 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
133 See ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 8. Relatively few of the licenses issued through the
FCC's lottery to nonwireline carriers actually went to entities planning to build cellular
networks. Most went to savvy entrepreneurs, stockbrokers, and lawyers, who then sold





As Part I makes clear, Congress and the FCC are at a crossroads in
terms of how to best insure the future of the nation's telecommunica-
tions. If they maintain the status quo and fail to react promptly and
properly to changing conditions, opportunities for significant deregu-
lation, greater competition, and technological advancement will be
lost. This Part analyzes the regulatory implications of the continuing
evolution of wireless broadband services and competitive local access,
and suggests regulatory modifications that would best respond to the
changes occurring in the industry.
A. Short-Run Analysis of the Effect of Cellular Technology on
Other Sectors of the Industry
Until recently, the potential impact of wireless communications
on other sectors of the market was minimal. Traditional cellular net-
works function as an extension of, rather than a replacement for, the
wired local and long distance networks.3> Only a very small percent-
age of cellular calls presently bypass the wired local networks. 135 Even
if a long distance company operates its own cellular networks-the
likely result of the AT&T-McCaw merger' 3 6-any call made from a Mc-
Caw phone to a wire-bound telephone or to a non-McCaw cellular
network would still have to be transmitted through at least one wired
local operating company.'3 7
Nevertheless, AT&T's potential short-term advantage vis-a-vis the
BOCs is in long distance calls made to or from its cellular networks,
which could be transferred directly from or to AT&T long distance
lines. Such a connection would bypass at least one wired local Operat-
ing Company. Unfortunately, AT&T's ability to take full advantage of
the economies of scope of its merger with McCaw have been severely
most cellular providers' corporate funds are tied up in acquiring frequency licenses, de-
spite the FCC's intention not to impose this burden on the development of cellular tech-
nology. Id.
134 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
135 Although the BOCs and the long distance carriers continue to argue over the de-
gree to which wired local access monopolies are being circumvented by wireless access
providers, the consensus is that only a very small percentage of calls currently bypass the
wired local networks. See Hass, supra note 22.
136 McCaw, the nation's largest cellular provider, currently operates its cellular net-
works under the name Cellular One. See Bart Ziegler et al., AT&T's Bold Be BusmNEsswEa_,
Aug. 30, 1993, at 26, 29. McCaw's cellular operations will soon be operated under the
name "AT&T Wireless Services". See AT&T-MCaw Complete Merger, Emerge as AT&T Wire-
less, ADVANCED WIr.SS COMM., Sept. 28, 1994.
137 It would be completely impractical for AT&T to operate its own local wired net-
work, despite the fact that AT&T is free to do so in any way other than to reacquire the
local Operating Companies. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 170 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub noam. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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hampered by AT&T's forced adherence to a Justice Department con-
sent decree, agreed to as a condition of the Justice Department's ap-
proval of the merger.x38 However, to the extent AT&T does bypass
the front or back ends of the wired local loop, it will save some por-
tion of the forty percent of its long distance revenues that it currently
pays to the Operating Companies for access to local networks.' 3
9 This
type of bypass is permitted under the 1982 MFJ,14° but at present, the
number of calls bypassing the local network in this fashion is
insignificant.1
4 1
A number of factors have traditionally limited the ability of cellu-
lar operators to bypass the wired local access loop. First, no nation-
wide cellular grid presently exists. Despite AT&T's post-merger status
as the nation's largest cellular provider, its networks cover only about
sixty-five percent of the national market.' 42 The cellular communica-
tions market is highly fragmented, with approximately 100 providers
nationwide, none possessing more than twenty percent of the mar-
ket.' 43 Second, cellular networks are not currently capable of achiev-
ing the 100% market penetration necessary to replace the wired local
networks. Because of the scarcity of cellular frequencies, the capacity
of presently operational networks could not come close to handling
the volume of calls made throughout the country.144 The scarcity of
frequencies also makes cellular service expensive.'45 The cost of con-
structing and operating traditional analog networks in relation to
138 In order to consummate its merger with McCaw, AT&T was forced to accept the
terms of a consent decree drafted by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,
which places considerable restrictions on the ability of AT&T to capture the economies of
scope associated with ownership of its own cellular networks. The Justice Department de-
cree includes an equal access provision allowing McCaw customers to choose their long
distance carrier, prohibits the bundling of services (i.e., package deals), requires the com-
panies to be operated as separate entities, and places restrictions on future contracts be-
tween AT&T and McCaw. These restrictions are to remain in place for 10 years. The FCC,
on the other hand, approved the merger with none of the above restrictions, demonstrat-
ing the lack of uniformity that has been the hallmark of modern telecommunications regu-
lation. The FCC required only that AT&T adopt a nondiscrimination policy with regard to
competitors in existing AT&T contracts. See FCC OK's AT&T-McCaw, U.S.-UK Resale; Sets
PCS Auction Date FCC REP., Sept. 22, 1994. Thus, the Justice Department has seemingly
seen clear to prolong the hopelessly inefficient two-tiered regulatory scheme (this time in
the realm of AT&T's cellular operations) that has plagued the industry for so long. See
infra part ll.D.2.
139 ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 14. AT&T paid the BOGs $14 billion in access
charges in 1992. See Thomas Mc Carroll, The Humongous Hookup, TMx, Aug. 30, 1993, at
33, 34.
140 See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
141 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142 Fleming Meeks, Move, Countermove FORBES, July 19, 1993, at 40, 40.
143 See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
144 See ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 11-12.
145 See William J. Cook, It's a Brave New Wireless World, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Oct. 4,
1993, at 93, 94.
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their maximum capacity is such that firms cannot lower rates to the
extent necessary to make analog cellular systems affordable for all tel-
ephone users.'4 The fixed capital costs of building and operating
these networks must be divided among relatively few users. Third, an-
alog cellular transmission is not compatible with new digital serv-
ices,147 and fourth, the security of these transmissions is very poor.148
When AT&T announced its intended merger with McCaw, it em-
phasized these factors in order to allay well founded, though irra-
tional, fears that it was attempting to reenter the local access
market. 49 A more realistic view of the merger is that AT&T is de-
pending on new wireless technologies, currently being tested and de-
veloped, to make wireless communication a viable substitute for wired
local operating networks.
150
B. Fiber Optics and Airwaves: The New Generation of Wired
and Wireless Networks
1. Prospects for Wireless Competition in the Local Loop
Notwithstanding the traditional limitations of cellular technol-
ogy, two recent developments promise to transform wireless commu-
nications from a novelty for wealthy jet-setters into the medium of
choice for future mass telecommunications. The first of these devel-
opments is the emergence of digital technology in wireless communi-
cations. 151 The second is the FCC's recent allocation of a large band
of high frequency spectrum for the construction of low powered, high
capacity wireless networks to provide Personal Communications Serv-
ices (PCS).152
a. The Digital Solution
Most of the major cellular operators are currently updating their
analog transmission systems with more efficient digital technology.
153
This technology dramatically increases the capacity of the allotted fre-
146 Id.
147 See CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 241-42.
148 Id
149 See Hass, supra note 22. The fact that AT&T had to make this argument at all
indicates the poor regulatory reasoning and resulting public paranoia that gave rise to the
fears. AT&T certainly hopes to bypass the local loop, but the public need not live in fear of
this eventuality. This bypass may well be the best thing that ever happened to competition
in the telecommunications industry, but the unreasonable belief persists that it is a return
to the Bell System monopoly.
150 See Ziegler et al., supra note 186, at 26.
151 See infra part II.B.l.a.
152 See infra part II.B.1.b. For a more thorough discussion of PCS technology and its
market applications, see RON SCHNEIDERMAN, WiRELiss PERSONAL ComituN=c7ios: THE
FuTuRE OF TALK 39-54 (1994).
153 See CALHouN, supra note 104, at 241-48.
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quencies by compressing the volume of signals transmitted. 54 It also
dramatically improves sound quality and call security while providing
lower operating costs.155
Cellular providers are currently working with two types of digital
technology-time division multiple access (TDMA) and code division
multiple access (CDMA)-and digital networks are coming on line as
this ink dries. TDMA digital technology packs three times as many
signals into the same bit of spectrum as contemporary analog sys-
tems. 156 CDMA technology, while still in the development stages,
promises to be even more efficient, increasing the capacity of frequen-
cies by at least ten times that of analog technology.157 Building new
cellular networks using these technologies is no more costly than
building new analog networks. Moreover, operating costs and the
cost of adding new subscribers to digital networks are lower.' 58 In
addition, the increased capacity allows providers to spread fixed costs
across a wider potential customer base.
Digital technology goes a long way toward solving the problems
that inhibit the universal use of cellular communication, but does not
eliminate them completely. Subscribers to cellular systems using digi-
tal technology must still incur significant expense in acquiring a hand-
set, although these prices are dropping significantly as the technology
matures. 59 Moreover, while the gains in frequency capacity are signif-
icant, especially in the case of CDMA, the volume of all calls currently
made nationwide still far exceeds the capacity of allotted frequency
spectrum. 60 In addition, the broadband revolution places a premium
on the ability to carry voice, data, and video communications simulta-
neously, as well as provide a host of supplemental services such as
voice mall and call waiting. Until recently, there simply was not
enough frequency spectrum to meet the expanding needs of the na-
tion's telecommunications consumers.
61
154 Id. at 7.
155 Id at 8-11.
156 SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 152, at 18-25. For a complete analysis of the impact of
digital technology on wireless telephone networks, see CALHOUN, supra 104, at 284-67.
157 Id.; cf. CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 360-67.
158 EcONOMIsr, supra note 32, at 8-11. While building digital wireless networks is ex-
pensive, much of the cost is incurred on a marginal basis-universal coverage within a
defined geographic area can be achieved at higher or lower cost, depending on the capac-
ity of the network and the number of subscribers. This is not the case with wired networks.
See supra note 34.
159 See ECONOMIsr, supra note 32, at 8.
160 CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 274.
161 See infra part ll.B. 1.b; see generay, Andrew Kupfer, The Future of the Phone Companies,
FORTUNE, Oct. 3, 1994, at 95.
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b. The FCC's PCS Initiative
In September 1993, the FCC announced that it would set aside
160 MHz of radio spectrum for the establishment of PCS.162 In addi-
tion, Congress has recently directed the Secretary of Commerce to
reallocate at least an additional 200 MHz of radio spectrum, previ-
ously reserved for government use, to new wireless services.' 63
PCS is a derivative of cellular technology, but employs microcellu-
lar structure at much higher frequencies. Combined with exclusively
digital technology, it drastically increases the capacity and transmis-
sion quality of the networks.'6 In addition, PCS handsets can be
made smaller and cheaper because of the higher frequency and lower
power of the transmission signal. In the near term, many of these
handsets will be made to accommodate both the lower frequency sig-
nals of traditional cellular and the higher frequency PCS transmis-
sions.165 Combining digital and microcellular technology with a
wealth of new spectrum, PCS constitutes the future of wireless broad-
band service. 166 The barrier to competition posed by the scarcity of
spectrum will be largely removed once the PCS auctions are
completed.' 6
7
Entrants are buying up pieces of the new PCS spectrum.168 The
first broadband PCS auction began in December 1994, and the gov-
ernment is expected to collect at least $10 billion from it.169 Licenses
will be auctioned in two forms. First, ninety-nine bands of spectrum,
divided among fifty-one major trading areas (MTAs), will be auc-
tioned. Two 30MHz licenses will be sold in each MTA, the three re-
maining licenses having been issued in December 1993 under the
FCC's pioneer preference policy.170 Second, a number of smaller
162 See Sean Scully, Comes the Revolution: Digital Wireless PCS, BROADCASTING & CABLE,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 22, 22; KELLOGG Er AL, supra note 6, at 78. Of this 160 MHz, 120 MHz
have been assigned to licensed PCS services and 40 MHz to unlicensed PCS devices. Id. at
79 n.17w. Of the 120 MHz allocated to licensed PCS, 60 MHz have been allocated to the
51 Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and 60 MHz allocated to the 492 Basic Trading Areas
(BTAs) to facilitate competition in individual markets between both small and large scale
PCS suppliers. SCHNEIDERMAN, supra note 152, at 47-48.
163 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Title VI, § 6001 (a).
164 See ECONOMISr, supra note 32, at 12.
165 See Leland Montgomery, The Guns of Augus FIN. WoRLD, Sept. 14, 1993, at 40.
166 See CALMOUN, supra note 104, at 37-38; Peter Huber, Telephony Unbottled, FoRBES,
Jan. 18, 1993, at 94.
167 See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 78; infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
168 See Montgomery, supra note 165, at 40.
169 See Mark Lewyn, A Boon For Telecoms, A Break For Taxpayers, Bus. WL, Oct. 18, 1993,
at 44.
170 See Communications, FCC Sets Date for Auction, Approves AT&T, McCaw Merger, Daily
Rep. for Execs. (BNA) (Sept. 20, 1994). The pioneer preference policy was established by
the FCC to encourage research and development of new technologies by awarding free
licenses to those companies demonstrating significant contributions to the development of
new communications technologies. Andrew C. Barrett & Byron F. Marchant, Emerging
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10MHz bands, each covering a smaller basic trading area, will be sold
to bidders and companies that already operate cellular networks
within that area.' 7 ' PCS networks are expected to be up and running
within a year of the auction's completion.
AT&T-McCaw is a major participant in the bidding for these new
bands of spectrum and is hoping, as is MCI and its own assembled
consortium, to piece together a national PCS network. 72 The BOGs
will also be substantial bidders. A rash of joint ventures and cellular
mergers have taken place within the BOG ranks in the hopes of in-
creasing their PCS auction buying power.17 Cable television firms,
looking to get a foothold in the wireless broadband market, are also
involved in joint ventures to buy up PCS licenses.' 74
The BOGs are, however, in an unenviable position going into the
auction because they are forbidden by the 1982 MFJ from engaging in
inter-LATA telecommunications. 75 All of the MTA licenses available
for bidding in the PCS auction are geographically larger than the
LATA boundaries they contain. Therefore, the BOCs will either have
to obtain court waivers to operate PCS networks throughout the MTAs
for which they bid successfully,' 76 or they will have to make corporate
structure changes to comply with the MFJ restrictions.177
In response to these pressures, Pacific Telesis elected to divide its
$21 billion in assets into two independent corporations in a tax-free
corporate reorganization.' 7 8 PacTel now runs the regulated local op-
erating activities, and the second company, AirTouch Communica-
tions, operates the wireless and unregulated activities. 179 Such a
reorganization is an effective means of escaping the restrictions.
These spin-offs, however, are indicative of the magnitude of the regu-
latory, as opposed to market-based, incentives that the line-of-business
restrictions of the 1982 MFJ impose on the industry. It is unsettling
that this kind of large-scale corporate restructuring is taking place for
the purpose of escaping a now tenuously justified quasi-regulatory
provision that never contemplated the market forces encouraging
such restructuring. These extrinsic regulatory incentives could be
Technologies and Personal Communications Series: Regulatoy Issues, 1 COMMiAW CONSPECrUS
3, 12 (1993).
171 See Cellular MergerFever Continues; Airtouch, U.S. West to Partner, 5 ADvANcED WiREuiss
COMM., Aug. 3, 1994 [hereinafter Cellular Merger Fever].
172 See Montgomery, supra note 165.
173 See Cellular Merger Fever, supra note 171.
174 Id.







very costly if and when legitimate market forces begin to dictate who
survives in the industry. 80
A problem faced by all prospective competitors in the PCS mar-
ket is that PCS networks will be expensive to build because of the tech-
nology involved and the large number of cells required. However, the
potential customer base is broad enough and the capacity of PCS net-
works high enough to make PCS a viable and efficient means of local
access. 181 The marginal cost of adding a new subscriber to the wired
local loop currently averages about $2000, and these costs are not de-
clining.'8 2 But the marginal cost of adding a subscriber to a cellular
or PCS network is far less. The established cellular carriers have in-
vested billions of dollars in equipment, and billions more will be spent
on PCS networks, but the marginal cost of adding new subscribers will
continue to decrease. 183 Existing cellular networks are increasing ca-
pacity at relatively low costs through digital technology, and PCS is
even more cost efficient.'
8 4
PCS networks promise to be what current cellular networks alone
are not-an economically feasibly competitive alternative to the wired
local operating systems that currently monopolize the local access
market. FCC rules will make it possible for the largest providers to
establish national PCS networks, while smaller firms will be able to
provide PCS service over smaller geographic areas.' 8 5 Congress and
the FCC have set aside enough spectrum to handle wireless voice,
data, and video communications throughout the country for years to
come.' 8 6 Most importantly, because of the abundance of allotted
spectrum, the FCC has established a licensing procedure that will al-
low as many as seven competitors in any one of the fifty-one major
markets established for PCS,'8 7 in addition to the two providers al-
ready competing in the cellular market. PCS also offers reasonable
hardware prices and lower startup costs for new subscribers. Without
having to dig up roads and snake tons of cable, residences and office
buildings can be connected to a wireless local system in a matter of
hours by installing a low powered transceiver. 188
As digital and PCS technologies proliferate, the BOCs will begin
losing the revenues they currently receive through access charges paid
180 See infra part II.D.
181 See KELLOGG Fr ETAL., supra note 6, at 2-3; see Margiotta, supra note 1, at 20; see infra
note 192.
182 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 2-3.
183 See id.; Huber, supra note 166, at 94.
184 See KELLOGG Ex AL., supra note 6, at 3; Huber, supra note 166, at 94.
185 See Cellular Merger Fever, supra note 171.
186 See Cook, supra note 145, at 94.
187 See SCHNEmERMAN, supra note 152, at 47; Lewyn, supra note 169, at 44.
188 See CALHOUN, supra note 104, at 40.
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by long distance carriers.' 8 9 They will also continue to see diminished
growth in new local access subscribers. 190 This places additional pres-
sure on the BOCs to invest in PCS technology, which promises to
make their local monopolies obsolete.' 9 ' In many cases, BOCs will be
offering PCS service in competition with the local BOC's wireline
service.
As one source has observed, "The competitive implications [of
digital and PCS technologies] are inescapable. Radio is going to put a
final end to the local exchange monopolies." 192 Ironically, all parties
concerned will be working toward that end. 93 A fact commonly over-
looked is that the monopolies of the seven BOCs extend only as far as
their individual regions. No BOC controls more than thirteen per-
cent of the total number of local access lines throughout the nation,
despite the fact that BOC ownership is extremely concentrated in
each BOC's service region.' 94 As a result, BOCs have as much incen-
tive as other competitors to seek the most lucrative markets in the
territory of other BOCs. Collusion among the BOCs is impossible be-
cause of the presence of other large players, such as AT&T and the
cable companies. Consequently, the BOCs will fight each other in for-
eign territory and defend themselves at home.
195
c. Wireline Competition in the Local Loop
In the near future, wireless technology will be the clear choice for
local communications, but the BOCs and their local access monopo-
lies also face a more immediate threat. The emergence of competitive
access providers (CAPs) poses a serious threat to the heart of the
BOCs' local access revenues-the servicing of corporate America.196
In addition, the broadband capability of cable television networks puts
the cable companies precariously close to having comprehensive local
access networks.' 9 7
189 See Montgomery, supra note 165.
190 BOG revenues have increased by only 2.3% per year over the past three years, as
opposed to increases of 4.3% per year in the long distance sector. See Kupfer, supra note
161. In 1991, 2.5 million cellular phones were placed in service nationally, as opposed to
1.9 million wired residential lines. The introduction of PCS will dramatically increase this
trend. See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 73.
191 See Montgomery, supra note 165.
192 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.
193 NYNEX, the New York based BOC, has already successfully test marketed a wireless
local loop system in New York City, which it has said will be cost competitive with the
traditional wired access network. See Margiotta, supra note 1, at 20.
194 See News Conference, supra note 33.
195 See EcONOMIsT, supra note 32, at 13; Montgomery, supra note 165.
196 See News Conference, supra note 33.
197 Many cable companies are prevented from providing local access telecommunica-




Currently, CAPs operate a minimum of 133 fiber optic local net-
works in at least seventy-two cities around the country, with more
under construction. 198 These networks are not universal in their cov-
erage, nor are they intended to be. They lead straight from the trunks
of long distance companies to major centers of commercial telephone
users-corporate headquarters, banks, insurance companies, hospi-
tals, universities, accounting firms, law firms, and anywhere else CAPs
can drop a few miles of cable and reap huge revenues. 199 This is
known as "cherry picking" or "cream skimming," and its goal is to ac-
quire customers from among the ten percent who produce the vast
majority of telecommunications revenues.
The disparity in the value of customers makes it potentially mis-
leading to rely on statements that the BOCs have a solid monopoly
because they control ninety-eight percent of the local market. None
of the BOCs individually controls more than thirteen percent of the
national local exchange market, and even if they control ninety-eight
percent of their own local exchange markets, 200 the two percent they
do not control may constitute twenty percent of the local exchange
revenues for the area.201 CAPs pursue consumers like General Elec-
tric, Bankers Trust, and White & Case-all of which are within a
couple miles of each other-but not customers like Bob's Discount
Records, Inc. Statistically, these customers are all corporate accounts,
but in terms of revenue generation, they are night and day. To assess
the degree of market penetration the CAPs are achieving, it is neces-
sary to determine the percentage volume of exchange calls they are
carrying in each of the local markets. Unfortunately, this data is not
available because traffic volumes on these lines are not reported.202
The growth in BOC revenues and the percentage of local telephone
lines controlled by the BOCs are inadequate measurements of the
CAP's market penetration.
2. Oligopoly in the Long Distance Sector
Today the local access "bottleneck," referred to in the 1982
MFJ,20 3 is in the process of developing into a competitive segment of
the telecommunications industry. Unfortunately, the regulatory prob-
198 Id.
199 See id
200 These figures are necessarily misleading because there is no accurate means of
determining exactly how much local traffic CAPs divert from the BOCs. Because these
networks are less regulated, no records exist to give an accurate picture. See i&.
201 See generally id. (noting that the absolute number of customers is less important
than the size of those customers).
202 See id.
203 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 171 (D.D.C. 1982), affid sub nor. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1988).
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lem facing Congress, the FCC, and the federal courts does not end
with the rise of competition in the local access sector. At the same
time competition in the long distance market has settled into a stag-
nant oligopoly.
When Judge Greene entered the MFJ in 1982, he assumed that
divestiture would separate the competitive part of the telecommunica-
tions industry from the natural monopoly.204 At that time, the MFJ
may have done just that. Today, however, it is much less clear which
part of the industry is competitive and which if any is the natural mo-
nopoly. In 1982, long distance communication depended on micro-
wave radio,20 5 and two or more competing providers could deploy
microwave towers as cheaply as the monopoly Bell System. Microwave
transmission consists of a radio capable of transmitting a limited
number of calls.20 6 Since microwave long distance networks must be
built to satisfy demand, costs rise as traffic volume increases. In eco-
nomic terms, this means that radio-based long distance services, like
wireless access services, are not natural monopolies.
207
Moreover, as Judge Greene was drafting the MFJ, long distance
companies were replacing microwave towers with new fiber optic
cable facilities.208 Radio was thus relegated to the fledgling cellular
communications industry which had little impact on the drafting of
the MFJ. The future of the local loop was seen strictly in terms of
copper wire, which involves a single provider whose long-run average
costs decrease as it serves more customers. 20 9 No one adequately fore-
saw the wireless communications technology that has since rapidly de-
veloped, nor did anyone envision the broadband capability of cable
television wires or the economies of running limited wired networks
through commercial centers.
Meanwhile, competition in the long distance sector has become
less healthy than commonly assumed. Microwave radio has almost
completely given way to fiber optic cable.210 The costs of initially de-
ploying a fiber optic network are high, but the long-run average costs
decline rapidly. The costs of creating the network are largely the
same whether the fiber optic cable contains one pair of optical fibers
204 IdJ at 160-70.
205 See KELLOGG Er. AL., supra note 6, at 4-7.
206 Id.
207 See supra notes 34, 92. Competition can be limited by the capacity of the airwaves
relative to the costs of the transmission network, but airwave overcrowding was not a seri-
ous concern in the case of long distance microwave transmissions. As a result, long dis-
tance telecommunications was considered a viable competitive market.
208 For example, Sprint ran an advertising campaign showing microwave transmission
towers being dynamited while promoting the benefits of fiber optics. See Kio o LT AL.,
supra note 6, at 5.
209 See supra notes 34, 92.
210 See KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 68.
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or ten, and whether the fiber carries a million calls or none at all.2 1 1
Virtually all these costs are fixed capital expenditures, and the salvage
value of the network is almost zero.
212
Accordingly, it makes economic sense to overbuild fiber optic
networks because a one million-circuit cable costs just about the same
as a ten thousand-circuit cable, and unused capacity can easily be
brought on-line as needed. As a result, the capacity of long distance
fiber optic networks currently in use vastly exceeds demand. 21 3 By
traditional standards, the long distance sector is approaching a natu-
ral monopoly, impeded only by serious overinvestment in fiber optic
cable and FCC price regulation. Each long distance carrier has
enough capacity to serve the entire market, and nearly all the costs
associated with long distance service are fixed overhead and capital
expenditures. As a carrier generates higher volume, it incurs no sig-
nificant marginal cost, which, in turn, contributes to decreasing aver-
age costs. Barring monopoly profits from the equation, the result is
lower prices for consumers.
Were it not for regulation, the long distance sector would proba-
bly be reverting quickly toward monopoly. Today, although the sector
is subject to FCC price-cap regulation,2 14 the Commission's main con-
cern is ensuring that AT&T does not lower its prices too quickly.215
When AT&T appears ready to lower its rates, competitors often peti-
tion the FCC to stop the proposed price cuts. 21 6 Thus, the FCC has
preserved the viability of AT&T's long distance competitors by sup-
pressing price competition. Former FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes per-
haps best explained the irony of this practice when he acknowledged
that FCC regulations "limit the ability of a major competitor-
AT&T-to compete. Current procedures afford competitors many
ways to energize the regulatory process to block price reductions po-
tentially offered by AT&T. Most important, this holds prices artifi-
cially higher, and reduces customer choice."217
211 Id. at 68-69.
212 Id. at 69.
213 According to the FCC, carriers other than AT&T that collectively serve less than
one-third of the long distance market are capable of supplying 146% of the market. Sprint
alone has "far more capacity than it could possibly hope to utilize in the near-term" and
"full provisioning of Sprint's fiber network [would allow it to serve demand] well in excess
of AT&T's total switched traffic volume for the year 1990." In re Competition in the Inter-
state Interexchange Marketplace, 6 F.C.C.R. 5880, 5888 (1991).
214 d.
215 Id. To ensure that AT&T does not engage in aggressive predatory pricing, they are
subject to both a floor and a ceiling under the price cap scheme. See MrrcuaLL & Vocat.-
SANG, supra note 69, at 168, 173.
216 See, e.g., In re Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 4 F.C.C.R.
2873, 3047-49 (1989).




One of the challenges to regulators as they phase out restrictions
on the BOCs will be to encourage competitive access to long distance
lines. There is ample capacity, but the problem is that fiber optic ca-
pacity is owned and controlled by three long distance carriers-
AT&T, MCI, and Sprint. Leasing arrangements as well as the sale of
excess fiber optic capacity are possible solutions to this problem. If
private sector allotments are restricted, a spot market for excess fiber
optic capacity could be created or long distance carriers could be re-
quired to sell excess capacity to the FCC, which could then auction off
that capacity to competitors. These solutions are intended to avoid
the cumulative installation of new fiber optic networks, while minimiz-
ing the regulatory costs of allocation.
C. Antitrust and Public Interest Implications of Vertical
Integration Among Telephone Companies
The debate surrounding the appropriate means of regulating the
telecommunications industry centers around two issues: (1) the pol-
icy interests at stake in hastening the development of a state-of-the-art
telecommunications network combining broadband voice, data, and
video services with the convenience of wireless technology in the local
sector, and (2) the competitive and antitrust concerns voiced most
vocally by the Justice Department and the federal courts. In the final
analysis, these two issues converge. Competition is protected and en-
couraged by our antitrust laws precisely because it increases produc-
tion efficiency, increases output, accelerates the rate of innovation,
and lowers consumer prices. These are all widely accepted benefits of
competition, but the manner in which the antitrust laws are enforced
can often restrict the very competition they are designed to protect.
This is the irony that has befallen the telecommunications industry.
Three premises guide the following inquiry into the antitrust and
public interest implications of vertical integration in the telecommu-
nications industry: (1) except under the most unusual circumstances,
more competition in the market is better than less competition; (2)
the 1982 MFJ, while premised on the guiding principle that more
competition is better, is an inefficient means of achieving maximum
levels of competition in the market because its rationale is hopelessly
at odds with the technological and competitive realities facing the
telecommunications industry, and (3) any assessment of competition
in the telecommunications industry should not only include, but em-
phasize the level of competition that exists in local access markets.
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1. The Federal Antitrust Laws
The backbone of the federal antitrust laws is the Sherman Anti-
trust Act.21 8 The Act makes it the unequivocal policy of the United
States to preserve free competition as the rule of trade.219 Section 1 of
the Act declares illegal "[e]very contract, combination..., or conspir-
acy, in restraint of [interstate or foreign trade]."220 Section 2 focuses
exclusively on monopolization, declaring it illegal to "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons to monopolize any part of [interstate trade] ."221
To supplement the broad language of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
Congress enacted the Clayton Act,222 which addresses specific prac-
tices that typically result in antitrust violations. Section 18 of the Clay-
ton Act makes any anticompetitive acquisition by one corporation of
another illegal. This provision is particularly relevant because of the
wave of merger activity occurring today in the telecommunications
industry.
223
2. The Communications Act Exception
Despite the broad language of the federal antitrust statutes, sec-
tion 221 (a) of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, concerning
mergers and acquisitions of FCC regulated telephone companies, 22
4
requires:
Upon application of one or more telephone companies for author-
ity to consolidate their properties or a part thereof into a single
company, or for authority for one or more such companies to ac-
quire... another telephone company,.. [a] public hearing shall
be held in all cases where a request therefor is made.... If the
Commission finds that the proposed consolidation, acquisition, or
control will be of advantage to the persons to whom service is to be
rendered and in the public interest, it shall certify to that effect; and
thereupon any Act or Acts of Congress making the proposed transaction un-
lawful shall not apply.
2 25
The effect of this section is to immunize, upon FCC approval, acquisi-
tions by one telephone company of another where the combined op-
erations would be subject to the Communications Act 22 6 In effect, if
218 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
219 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
220 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
221 Id. § 2.
222 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et seq. (1988).
223 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
224 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1988).
225 47 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
226 In re Southwestern Bell Telephone, 1 F.C.C.2d 1420, 1437 (1965) (quoting In re
Wisconsin Telephone Company, 27 F.C.C. 1, 18 (1959)).
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two telecommunications firms intend to merge, or one wishes to ac-
quire the other, they or any other telephone company may request,
and must be granted, a hearing. If it determines the merger to be in
the public interest, the FCC must exempt the companies involved in
the proposed merger or acquisition from antitrust prosecution. This
directs the inquiry away from the effects of a merger on competition,
as required by the antitrust laws, and towards its effects on the public
interest.2 27 These inquiries are closely related in many respects, as the
public interest is usually best served by maximum competition in the
market,228 but past FCC decisions under section 221(a) have focused
on the impact of a proposed merger or acquisition on the quality of
telephone service.
2 29
3. Synthesis of Federal Antitrust Laws and the Communications Act
In addition to being subject to the FCC's public interest analysis,
the parties to the 1982 MFJ, when seeking to merge with or acquire
other telephone companies, are also bound by the terms of thatjudg-
ment. The legal basis of the 1982 MFJ was the Bell System's violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.23 0 The court's authority to
decide the case on antitrust grounds was predicated on the fact that
the Communications Act exception, like other statutory antitrust ex-
emptions, is "strictly construed and strongly disfavored."231 As the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia reasoned in United States v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.:232
Neither the language, nor the legislative history of the Communica-
dons Act supports the conclusion that Congress intended by the Act
to grant a total, blanket immunity to defendants from application of
antitrust laws, and to place exclusive jurisdiction over all their con-
duct in the Federal Communications Commission.233
Under the court's construction of the Communications Act excep-
tion, the FCC's authority to exempt telecommunications industry
mergers and acquisitions from the antitrust laws is strictly limited to
the act of combining the companies. The FCC has no authority to
exempt industry participants, including companies that are the prod-
227 Id.
228 See United States v. AT&T, 498 F. Supp 353 (D.D.C. 1980).
229 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. FCC rulings on acquisitions tend to
focus heavily on improving service to customers by exempting these acquisitions from the
antitrust laws. This suggests that the FCC considers it possible to find that a merger is both
in the public interest and violative of antitrust provisions. See Southwestern Bell supra 1
F.C.C. 2d at 1437.
230 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nora. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
231 Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, 476 U.S. 409, 421 (1986).
232 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 966 (1977).
233 Ia- at 61.
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uct of an exempt merger, from antitrust scrutiny of their ongoing
operations.23
In 1982, the Bell System agreed to a consent decree that held Bell
in violation of federal antitrust laws. The Decree fashioned a remedy
that precluded the BOGs from combining with long distance or man-
ufacturing interests and prohibited AT&T from acquiring stock or as-
sets of the BOGs.23 5 Notwithstanding its authority under the
Communications Act to sanction a merger of telephone companies,
the FCC may not contravene a judgment of the district court that is
premised on a nonexempt violation of the antitrust laws.23 6 An FCC
ruling that a BOC acquisition of a long distance company was in the
public interest would still leave the BOG open to contempt charges
for violating a valid court order.
The law of primary regulatory jurisdiction, which allocates au-
thority over the initial determination of an issue between the district
courts and the regulatory agencies,23 7 plays a significant role in the
merger exemption process. In areas in which the FCC has particular
expertise and its regulatory authority is predicated on the public inter-
est in maintaining a uniform national policy, the Commission usually
has primary jurisdiction over the matter.23 3 In the case of telephone
company mergers, section 221 (a) gives the FCC a clear mandate to
regulate such combinations in the public interest, thus giving rise to
application of primary regulatory jurisdiction when deciding the fate
of telephone company mergers.
FCC primary jurisdiction, in addition to the Commission's au-
thority to declare combinations immune from antitrust laws, strongly
dissuades the courts from passing on the antitrust merits of telephone
company mergers prior to an FCC ruling on the matter.23 9 If a court
wants to hear such a case, it normally does so only by asserting other
jurisdictional grounds, such as whether the merger violates a valid
court order or consent decree.
24°
234 See Essential Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 610 F.2d 1114 (3d Cir. 1979)
(Congress intended no blanket antitrust exemption for telecommunications industry);
Woodlands Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 447 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D. Tex. 1978)
(Communications Act is not so pervasive as to impliedly displace antitrust laws).
235 See supra part IA2.
236 See supra part I.A.2.
237 Woodlands, 447 F. Supp. at 1267.
238 Id.
239 AT&T v. Delta Communications, 408 F. Supp. 1075 (S.D. Miss. 1976) (telephone
company immune from antitrust violation for charging and collecting tariffs previously
approved by FCC), af'd, 579 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 926 (1979);
A=~ED C. AMAN, JR. & WiLLIAM T. MAYrON, ADMnsrmST IV LAw, 430-33 (1993); Woodlands,
447 F. Supp. at 1266-67.
240 AMAN & MAYroN, supra note 239, at 432-33.
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The law of primary regulatory jurisdiction helps explain the na-
ture of the lawsuit Southwestern Bell filed against AT&T when AT&T
announced its intention to merge with McCaw. The BOG attacked
the merger on the grounds that it violated the MFJ, rather than argu-
ing that it violated section 18 of the Clayton Act.241 McCaw maintains
cellular partnerships with a number of BOGs, and Section I(D) of the
MFJ forbids AT&T to acquire the "stock or assets of any BOG." Judge
Greene ruled that the merger violated the MFJ, but subsequently
granted AT&T's motion for a waiver of the Section I(D) prohibition
on the basis that AT&T had shown that circumstances had changed
since 1982.242
The FCC approved the AT&T-McCaw merger in September 1994,
at the same time that it announced the PCS broadband auction
date.243 The Commission imposed very few restrictions on the deal,
leaving AT&T to exercise whatever economies of scope the merger
presents.2 44 Justification for the FCC's approval of the merger lies in
the fact that AT&T's presence at the forefront of wireless technology
is likely to hasten the development and proliferation of a beneficial
service,245 and is therefore in the public interest.
The Justice Department, however, took a different approach to
the merger, an approach that will delay the true integration of AT&T
and McCaw for as long as ten years.2 46 The Department entered into
a consent decree with AT&T that imposes considerable restrictions on
the operations of the combined entity which it argues are necessary to
prevent the combination from becoming anticompeitive.2 47 This
Consent Decree includes an equal access provision, prohibits bun-
dling of services, requires that the two companies be operated as sepa-
rate entities, and restricts future contracts between them.2 48
Most commentators agree that there is no justification for keep-
ing AT&T out of the wireless sector.2 49 There is, however, a strong
difference of opinion as to how far into the wireless sector AT&T
should be allowed to go. Looking back upon our three basic prem-
241 See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
242 See Green Grants MFJ Waiver for AT&T-MCaw Merger, 5 PCS NEWs, Sept. 1, 1994.
The change-of-circumstance criterion is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk CountyJail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
243 See Four Bells Harmonize on Call for Consent Decree's End, supra note 16.
244 Seei&
245 AT&T's Bell Laboratories is one of the premier research and development facilities
in the world. In addition, AT&T can invest large sums to update and expand its networks.
See WilliamJ. Cook, et al., The Levitation of a Giant, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 30, 1993,
at 58.
246 See Four Bells Harmonize on Call for Consent Decree's End, supra note 16.
247 Id.; see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
248 See Four Bells Harmonize on Call for Consent Decree's End, supra note 16.
249 See supra part HIC.
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ises, this Note suggests the following answer: all the way. The FCC
expects that PCS networks "will be subject to substantial competition,
both from other PCS services... and from the wide range of radio-
based services currently offered: cellular services, specialized mobile
radio services, paging services, wireless in-building services, cordless
phones, and others."250 In the absence of a wireless bottleneck,251 the
Justice Department's concern that other long distance carriers will
lose access to McCaw's cellular networks is misplaced. Accordingly,
there is no economic rationale for imposing equal access require-
ments and antibundling provisions on what, absent regulation, would
be a clean interface with a competitive wireless market.2 52
Nevertheless, the Justice Department's new Consent Decree may
make some sense if the BOCs must continue to suffer under the 1982
MFJ, which prevents them from directly interfacing their cellular op-
erations with long distance facilities. It may be necessary to restrict
the movement of the industry towards its most naturally competitive
state in order to prevent AT&T from overrunning the wireless opera-
tions of the BOCs, whose ability to compete is hampered by prohibi-
tive regulation. In effect, the Justice Department has attached a ten-
year lead weight to AT&T to bring it down to the level of the BOCs.
The logic underlying this regulation is perhaps the greatest argument
of all for consolidating regulatory authority over telecommunications.
The Justice Department appears intent on maintaining the status
quo by imposing more decree-based restrictions on vertical integra-
tion, even though the 1982 MFJ specifically recognized AT&T's right
to pursue all viable means of bypassing the BOCs' local access monop-
olies. Now that AT&T is on the verge of completing calls all over the
nation without the need for local access from the BOCs, the Justice
Department is balking out of fear that the market will not do its job.
While the FCC appears ready to take the next step in moving the in-
dustry forward by eliminating the line-of-business restrictions on the
BOCs and by giving AT&T the go ahead to fully integrate its long
distance and cellular operations, theJustice Department is caught in a
1982 time warp.
D. Some Solutions to a Perplexing Problem
Understanding the technologies emerging in the telecommunica-
tions industry gives some indication of what lies ahead and what kinds
of adjustments need to be made to the current regulatory structure.
However, it is impossible to predict the optimal industry structure for
the future. The disparity between the telecommunications industry
250 7 FC.C.R. at 94.
251 See id.; see KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 89.
252 KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 6, at 78.
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contemplated by the 1982 MFJ and that which has since evolved
clearly demonstrates this problem. No one knows what new technolo-
gies will emerge, nor what firms are likely to triumph. Long distance
giants like AT&T and MCI are well positioned to enter the full service
market, and the BOCs and large cable television firms have the poten-
tial to become major full service competitors.2 53 Large equipment
manufacturers such as Motorola are also poised to become major par-
ticipants in the new era of telecommunications. 254
Despite these uncertainties, it is clear that the telecommunica-
tions industry will undergo significant change within a relatively short
period of time.2 5 5 To adequately respond to these changes, the regu-
latory scheme must be flexible and streamlined. It is also important
that regulation not slow technological development any more than
necessary by attempting to micromanage emerging markets within the
industry.256 As the pace of technological change quickens, profits will
be increasingly sensitive to the rapid development and marketing of
products.25 What follows are some suggested congressional and FCC
courses of action that will help to bring about an appropriate regula-
tory structure.
1. Legislatively Invalidate the 1982 MFJ and Place Full Regulatory
Authority With the FCC
For the time being, the local access market remains a monopoly.
However, local monopolies will disappear as fully competitive wire-
line, and more convenient and efficient wireless alternatives become
available to consumers. Of great concern to the BOCs is the prospect
of losing the ten percent of their customers that generate the majority
253 For a description of how the cable companies and BOCs are planning to build full
service networks, see Ziegler et al., supra note 136, at 56.
254 Motorola, the largest producer of wireless communications equipment, is currently
backing an ambitious satellite communications network known as Iridium. Iridium is
scheduled to bring wireless phone service to the world by way of 66 low-orbit satellites by
1998. Motorola is looking to expand wireless technology in order to create larger markets
for its handsets, which currently account for 35% of the company's earnings. As the cost of
handsets has declined rapidly over the last decade, margins on equipment sales have
shrunk to the point that greater demand is needed to boost profits. Motorola hopes to
score with a worldwide seamless network that will send signals directly to small handheld
units manufactured by Motorola. The prospect of a worldwide seamless network is particu-
larly attractive to third world countries, which could be brought quickly, and relatively
cheaply, into the modem telecommunications era through this technology. While the
technology remains to be peifected, and the projected operation date is certainly ambi-
tious, the technology could be viable in the near future. For a detailed description of
Motorola's Iridium project and other proposed satellite wireless communications net-
works, see Nancy Hass, Preemptive Strike FiN. WoRLD, Sept. 14, 1993, at 36.
255 See part II.B.
256 See Berg, supra note 15, at 15.
257 See infra text accompanying notes 298-99.
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of BOG revenues. 258 These big commercial consumers will be the first
to tap the economies of competitive access provider (CAP) service and
discounted end-to-end service via wireless computer and phone net-
works and fiber-optic long distance.25 9 If the BOCs are unable to cre-
ate strategic alliances in the long distance sector before their
corporate rate base is eroded, they will suffer a serious competitive
disadvantage vis-a-vis other large telecommunications firms.2 60
Since 1982, AT&T and the BOCs have been subject to a two-tier
regulatory scheme consisting of both FCC regulations and district
court enforcement of the MFJ.2 61 This scheme has helped to create at
least the appearance of competition in the long distance sector, but
modem changes in telecommunications markets have obviated the
need for the district court's role in the regulatory process. As CAP,
cable television, and PCS networks emerge as substitutes for the local
access monopolies, the ability of the BOCs to exploit the local market
through cross subsidization and price gouging is virtually eliminated.
Any such attempt would simply hasten consumer movement away
from their networks and toward the new substitute technologies.
As full service becomes the competitive standard in the industry
and the threat of monopoly diminishes, no justification remains for
prohibiting the BOCs from participating in strategic vertical integra-
tion.262 The legal basis of the MFJ, as stated in the government's com-
plaint in the AT&T antitrust action, is section 2 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.2 63 As the Act has been interpreted, a section 2 violation
occurs whenever a holder of monopoly power unreasonably restrains
trade in violation of section 1 of the Act, which bans any contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade.26 AT&T's predivesti-
ture actions exhibited this illegal behavior. However, allowing the
BOCs to contract and combine to facilitate their development as full
service telecommunications firms would not restrain trade, but rather
258 See supra notes 200.02 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 12, 119-27 and accompanying text.
262 Whereas AT&T, MCI, and other long distance carriers are justifiably wary of the
BOGs' emergence into full service telecommunications, they have opposed BOG entry into
the full service market out of a desire to avoid increased competition, rather than out of
fears that a BOG might reestablish a monopoly in the industry. It is virtually inconceivable
that any one firm could achieve monopoly control, and certainly not any of the BOGs.
Logistically, it is more likely that AT&T could achieve such control given the line-of-busi-
ness restrictions currently imposed on the BOGs than it would be for any of the BOGs to
attain it if the restrictions were eliminated. Either way, the possibility is too remote to be a
serious threat.
263 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 139 (D.D.G. 1982), afJ'd sub non. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
264 Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292 (D.RI. 1980).
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would further competition in the local and full service telecommuni-
cations markets.
Under emerging market conditions, the remaining line-of- busi-
ness restrictions, which the MFJ imposes on the BOCs, are a crippling
handicap for the otherwise capable firms.265 This is particularly true
of the ban on BOCs entering the long distance sector.266 The BOGs'
local monopolies are no longer secure, as the most profitable com-
mercial accounts are vulnerable to CAP and full service alternatives
that will offer large discounts to these customers,267 and the BOCs will
lose these accounts if they are unable to supply competitive end-to-
end service.
Removing the district court's long distance ban would free the
BOCs to create strategic alliances with existing long distance carriers
and to buy or lease excess capacity from them.268 In the early stages
of deregulation, the BOCs would likely possess a competitive advan-
tage in their established local markets, but they would face a relative
disadvantage in the long distance market and in remote local
markets.2 6
9
The public has much to gain by allowing the BOGs to evolve into
full service telecommunications companies. The strongest of the
BOGs are well run and increasingly innovative companies.270 These
firms are capable of competing effectively in the modern telecommu-
nications era if given the regulatory freedom they need to compete
head-to-head with each other and with other firms in a full service
market.27' Removal of the remaining restrictions placed on the BOCs
would unleash seven potentially powerful full service competitors into
the national telecommunications market. This would mean lower
costs and better service for consumers.
265 See Hass, supra note 22.
266 See id. According to Bell South CEO, John Clendendin, "The current system is not
benefitting anyone but AT&T. While everybody and their cousin is allowed to play in our
backyard, we are [forbidden to enter the long distance sector]. That disadvantages not just
the RBOCs but the economy and consumers themselves." Id.
The other important line-of-business restriction facing the BOGS is the ban on equip-
ment manufacturing. See Alan Pearce, It's Time for the judge to Move on to Greener Pastures,
NETwoRK WoRLD, Mar. 15, 1993, at 26.
267 See Hass, supra note 22. Peter Huber of the Manhattan Institute, a New York think
tank, has said that "[iun telecommunications, the customers who matter are the 10% who
generate 90% of the revenues. The long distance companies will go to any length to ob-
scure that fact." Id.
268 See supra part II.B.2.
269 See Hass, supra note 22. It is unlikely that the BOGs would ever establish fiber optic
networks to compete directly with the AT&T, MCI, and Sprint networks. Rather, they want
the right to resell such services to their local customers and enter into strategic alliances
with other long distance companies. Id.




Finally, removing the district court from the regulatory structure
would consolidate day-to-day regulation of the telecommunications in-
dustry with one agency, the FCC. This would be consistent with the
purposes of the Federal Communications Act, which specifically lists
consolidation of regulatory authority as one of its goals.2 72 By replac-
ing the current two-tiered regulatory scheme with a uniform national
policy, consolidation would serve to make the regulatory scheme less
administratively complex, more streamlined, and more predictable.
Additionally, the FCC is generally more qualified to assess the day-to-
day regulatory needs of the industry than is the district court, particu-
larly now that the technology is changing on a day-to-day basis. Never-
theless, the court has to date rigorously resisted all BOC petitions
under section VIII of the MFJ to have the remaining long distance and
equipment manufacturing bans lifted.2 73 Without the court's cooper-
ation, the alternative is legislative action.
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[t] o regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations and among the several States."2 74 In Kat-
zenbach v. McClung,275 the Supreme Court held that the power of
Congress in the area of commerce is broad and sweeping, and when it
stays within its sphere and violates no express constitutional limita-
tion, the Court will not interfere.2 76 It is only when Congress remains
silent, or in the rare instance in which Congress offends other consti-
tutional provisions in the exercise of its commerce power, that the
courts have authority to pass law in this area.277 Congress should exer-
cise its Commerce Clause power to invalidate the MFJ and place full
regulatory authority in the hands of the FCC.
2 78
The unequivocal invalidation of the AM is necessary to avoid the
pitfalls of proposed legislation such as Senate Bill 1822,279 which, if
passed, would congest court dockets for years. Rather than remove
regulatory focus from the courts, the Bill incorporates a series of tests
and procedural safeguards that would eventually lift the line-of-busi-
272 One of the fundamental purposes of the Federal Communications Act was the con-
solidation of regulatory authority within a single regulatory agency. The Act states that "for
the purpose of securing a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional authority ....
there is created [the Federal Communications Commission] .... which shall execute and
enforce the provisions of this Chapter." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
273 See Four Bells Harmonize on Call for Consent Decree's End, supra note 16.
274 U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
275 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
276 Id. at 305.
277 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); United States v. Lopez,
No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. Lexis 3039 (Apr. 26, 1995).
278 Incident to the commerce power of Congress is the power to delegate authority to
regulatory agencies. The FCC derives its authority under the Communications Act of 1934
in this manner.
279 S. 1822, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See supra notes 20, 40 and accompanying text.
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ness restrictions imposed by the MFJ. Each of these tests and safe-
guards would inevitably result in court challenges and battles over
interpretation. Congress must take the crucial first step in the regula-
tory restructuring process by unequivocally invalidating the 1982 MFJ,
but Congress ought not to make the mistake of imposing its own tests
and safeguards on the elimination of restrictions on the BOCs. This is
by no means an attempt to minimalize the complexity of the issues
involved in deregulating the industry. To the contrary, the issues are
extremely complex and, therefore, best left to the regulatory and tech-
nological expertise of the FCC as opposed to the less responsive exer-
cise of the general jurisdiction of the federal district courts. To
condition the exercise of FCC discretion to deregulate the BOCs on
legislatively prescribed tests and safeguards simply invites protracted
litigation in the federal courts, accomplishing little of what the legisla-
tion is needed for.
As an incident to invalidation of the MFJ, the LATA barriers es-
tablished by the MFJ would be eliminated, clearing the way for the
BOCs to participate in the nationwide PCS market without artificial
restraints. This would obviate the need for section VIII waiver peti-
tions every time the BOCs want to operate wireless or other networks
across LATA boundaries.280 In addition, eliminating the MFJ sooner
rather than later would help to minimize the other extrinsic incen-
tives imposed on the BOCs by the prohibitions of the MFJ. The mar-
ket and principles of efficiency would determine strategic corporate
combinations and restructurings, while the impact of regulation on
the strategic maneuverings of the industry would be kept to a
minimum.281
2. Legislatively Invalidate the AT&T-McCaw Justice Department
Consent Decree
Along with the invalidation of the 1982 MFJ, Congress must also
invalidate the AT&T-McCaw Justice Department Consent Decree re-
stricting the full integration of AT&T and McCaw in order to protect
the competitive position of AT&T in the face of full service BOCs.
28 2
These two consent decrees stand as justifications for each other, but
neither can be justified alone.
By eliminating both decrees, AT&T and the BOCs would be
placed in their most competitive positions, and market determinants
would begin to dictate competitive behavior. AT&T would undoubt-
edly survive the transition from oligopolist to competitive full service
provider, but AT&T would face a serious challenge from the BOCs.
280 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
281 See supra text accompanying notes 178-80.
282 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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This one-two dose of deregulation would provide great market flexi-
bility to eight of the largest telecommunications firms in the country.
However, it would not give them carte blanche to do whatever they
please. The antitrust laws would remain in full force and effect, and a
close eye can and would be kept on industry activity.
283
3. Eliminating Rate-of-Return Regulation
The FCC has authority to regulate interstate telecommunications
rates under section 152 of the Communications Act.28 4 Under the
present regulatory scheme, however, section 152(b) of the Communi-
cations Act expressly prohibits the FCC from regulating intrastate tele-
phone rates.28 5 The result of this prohibition is that access charges for
both single LATA (local) calls and long distance calls made within a
single state are regulated by state agencies rather than the FCC.286
This federal-state rate regulation scheme was adopted by Congress in
the wake of a 1930 Supreme Court ruling in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co.,287 in which the Court found that division of phone company
property into interstate and intrastate categories was necessary to de-
termine the appropriate governmental authority to regulate each cate-
gory.2 8 8 This dual price regulation scheme remains in effect, even
though it is not in the best interests of the industry.
In keeping with the view that local access telecommunications is a
natural monopoly,28 9 the FCC and state regulatory agencies have tra-
ditionally regulated local access prices on a rate-of-return basis.290 In
recent years, the FCC has moved away from rate-of-return pricing for
interstate local access, as evidence continues to mount that such pric-
ing is no longer appropriate. Many state jurisdictions, however, con-
tinue to regulate local access for intrastate long distance and single
LATA calls on a rate-of-return basis.
The theory behind rate-of-return pricing is relatively straight for-
ward. Regulators replace the market as the enforcer of economic effi-
ciency by establishing the cost structure considered most
representative of costs in a competitive market. Establishing prices
involves negotiation between the regulated company and the regula-
283 See supra part ll.C.1.
284 Section 152 makes the provisions of the Communications Act and FCC authority
applicable to intrastate telecommunications, while § 201 of the Act deals specifically with
pricing. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (1988).
285 Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986).
286 Id. at 433.
287 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
288 Id. at 145.
289 See supra notes 34, 92.
290 See MicHAEL K. KELLOGG Er AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATMNS LAw 429 (1992).
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tors, with the final figure usually being a compromise between a com-
petitive market and monopoly pricing.291
Once the cost structure has been established, the regulators must
ensure the economic viability of the essential service provider by ad-
ding a pre-set rate of return on invested capital. The regulators set
the rate of return so as to place the regulated firm on par with firms in
comparable competitive industries.292 The optimal result is a rate of
return high enough to attract the necessary investors, but not so high
as to give the regulated industry an unfair advantage in the capital
markeL2
93
In theory, rate-of-return pricing can be a reasonably efficient
means of setting prices in a monopoly situation. However, this is true
only if the following three conditions are met: (1) the regulated com-
pany is in fact a natural monopoly and no other firms would choose to
enter were pricing left to the free market, (2) regulators can and do
ferret out inefficiencies in the cost structure and establish a cost basis
that closely resembles the costs that would exist in a competitive envi-
ronment, and (3) the technology employed to provide the regulated
service or product is not currently undergoing or expected to un-
dergo significant technological change.
294
These three conditions are all disappearing in the new era of tele-
communications. The natural monopoly status of local access tele-
communications is currently being challenged by CAPs, wireless
access networks, and cable television networks. In addition, the inabil-
ity of regulators to establish a cost structure similar to that which
would exist in a competitive market has been a long standing draw-
back to rate-of-return pricing schemes. This is particularly true of tel-
ephone companies whose cost structures are complex and include
fungible expenses which can be attributed to both monopoly and
competitive businesses. Finally, technological innovation is presently
occurring at a rapid pace in the industry, and rate-of-return regulation
has the effect of stifling technological progress.2 95 Until recently,
technological progress in the local exchange sector occurred at a rela-
tively slow pace. Copper cables form the backbone of the wired local
networks, and the networks have not changed much since the BOCs
were severed from AT&T. This is an ideal setting for a rate-of-return
pricing scheme. Regulators and the BOCs have established long de-
291 See Hass, supra note 22.
292 See In reAT&T, 9 F.C.C.2d 30 (1967).
293 Because the rate of return is pre-established, it is set slightly below average return
rates for comparable companies in competitive industries. This discrepancy reflects the
decreased risk associated with investing in a rate-of-return regulated company.
294 For a discussion of the effect of rapid technological change on rate-of-return pric-
ing, see Berg, supra note 15.
295 d. at 16.
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preciation schedules reflecting the useful life of the capital equipment
used to complete local calls.2 96 As a result, the prices set closely re-
flect the actual costs of providing the service, plus the set rate of re-
turn, and still remain relatively constant from year to year.
As the rate of technological change increases, the useful life of
new equipment shortens because it becomes obsolete more quickly.2 97
It is very difficult to achieve market penetration for technologically
dynamic goods and services priced on a rate-of-return basis because
the price of the new service must exceed short run costs. Since a rate-
of-return regulated company must always turn a predetermined profit,
there is no flexibility to employ corporate marketing strategies such as
decreasing margins in the short run to achieve greater efficiencies in
the long run.2
98
The local access market is currently undergoing precisely the
kind of technological change that makes rate-of-return regulation
inefficient 2 99 Whereas CAPs and new wireless competitors have tre-
mendous incentives to develop substitutes for the existing local access
monopolies, the BOCs have systematically fewer incentives to bring
the wired networks up to modern technological standards. Prices for
local service reflect any new capital expenditures for equipment in
proportion to its useful life. Accordingly, any attempt at wholesale
modernization of the BOCs' local networks would be extremely un-
popular with rate payers, at least until the capital costs were recovered.
Rate-of-return pricing poses a further problem in the short-run
transition from monopoly control to competition. Because rates are
set according to a BOC's cost function, the BOC has a great incentive
to engage in cost shifting, or cross subsidization.300 This involves sub-
sidizing competitive activities by shifting costs to noncompetitive activ-
ities whose profits are determined by a rate-of-return pricing scheme.
The result is a pre-set rate of return for noncompetitive operations
and higher profits for competitive operations, which experience lower
competitive costs due to cost shifting. Cost shifting is one of the pri-
mary justifications for excluding the BOCs from competitive markets.
It is nearly impossible for regulators to allocate costs accurately
among various operations, particularly when costs benefit both com-
petitive and noncompetitive divisions. The incentive to cost shift is
greatly reduced under a price cap system because the overall return
296 See Berg, supra note 15 (noting that slow technological development allows rate-of-
return regulated companies to recoup capital investment over a long period of time).
297 Id.
298 Id.
299 See supra part II.B.
300 See KELLOGG, ET AL, supra note 6, at 62.
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on any capital investment will be unaffected by cost shifting from com-
petitive to noncompetitive operations.
Thus, to provide all local access providers with the necessary in-
centives to compete in a full service market, the rate-of-return pricing
scheme for local service must be completely eliminated. Prices should
reflect the long term economies of strategic technological progress,
rather than focus solely on short-run costs plus a preset return. The
BOGs will then be in a position to profit from any increased efficien-
cies that result from their investments in new technology. Risk to in-
vestors will increase, but so will the potential gains.
The major impediment to completely eliminating rate-of-return
pricing in the telecommunications industry is the FCC's lack of au-
thority to regulate intrastate rates under section 152(b) of the Com-
munications Act. The FCC tested this limitation, by attempting to
preempt state regulation of depreciation schedules for intrastate
equipment, but the regulation was struck down in Louisiana PSC. Ab-
sent the express prohibition of section 152(b), however, Congress
would possess authority under the Commerce Clause to grant regula-
tory control of intrastate local access rates to the FCC. According to
the Shreveport Rate Case,30 ' Congress may regulate intrastate rates to
prevent injurious discrimination against interstate commerce.
In the new era of telecommunications, the line between intrastate
and interstate telecommunications will become increasingly ob-
scure.302 The regulation of intrastate rates on a rate-of-return basis
will continue to harm interstate telecommunications because it
retards the ability of the BOCs to evolve into competitive full service
telecommunications companies. The prospects for competition in
the interstate telecommunications market are, therefore, inseparably
tied to the regulation of intrastate access charges. With this in mind,
Congress should extend the FCC's authority to regulate intrastate tele-
communications rates under the- new legislation.
4. Maintenance of Price Caps on Core Services
In the absence of rate-of-return pricing, the state and or FCC reg-
ulators must continue to ensure that unsophisticated individuals will
be able to obtain basic phone service at affordable prices. The elimi-
301 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1913) (holding that
Congress may regulate intrastate rates of a railway carrier where state regulation of such
rates causes injury to interstate commerce).
302 The division has always been somewhat arbitrary since much of the equipment and
service characterized as interstate or intrastate in fact is used fungibly for both. See KEL-
LOGG Er AL., supra note 291, at 432-49. As the barrier between local and long distance
communication and equipment manufacturing erodes, the distinction will become even




nation of rate-of-return pricing could adversely affect this important
public policy interest.
3 03
Because profitability is guaranteed under the rate-of-return sys-
tem, the BOCs can offer phone service to remote areas at subsidized
prices without suffering any particular hardship. City dwellers in
apartments serviced by a single conduit spliced 100 ways each pay the
same monthly access fee as a farmer who lives five miles from any-
where and requires a dedicated line to receive telephone service. In
the end, the city dwellers pay more than their cost share, and the
farmer less, but the BOC generates the same fixed rate of return
either way.3
04
When rate-of-return pricing is removed, the local access providers
have an incentive to lower prices for service to large customers and
customers in urban dwellings, who have been paying prices that signif-
icantly exceed the marginal cost of providing service to them. At the
same time, local access providers have an incentive to raise prices for
rural customers for whom the marginal cost of service is significantly
higher. Without some protection for rural and suburban customers,
the cost of service is likely to increase dramatically under price dereg-
ulation.30 5 In order to protect these small, remote users, the FCC
should take measures to ensure that no service will be discontinued as
a result of deregulation and that no prohibitive increases in access
charges will be imposed on these customers.
The simplest and most manageable solution would be to place
price caps on local access to any currently operative wired network.
30 6
These price caps should be based on the average cost of providing
service to all customers, thus continuing the current subsidization of
telephone service for suburban and rural customers.30 7 Price caps,
however, would not have the stifling effect on technological develop-
ment that the rate-of-return scheme does. This is because any invest-
ment that would decrease the long-run average cost of providing local
exchange service would result in increased profits and returns to in-
vestors. Under rate-of-return pricing, such efficiency gains are lost in
the updated cost structure, and the rate of return remains at the mar-
ket level.308
303 Id
304 Cf. supra note 293 and accompanying text (implied in the concept of a constant
rate of return is the idea that profits remain the same regardless of any capital expendi-
tures spent to connect distant users).
305 See Berg, supra note 15, at 16 (removal of the rate-of-retum pricing scheme.will put
upward pressure on access prices in remote areas).
306 Dennis Patrick, former FCC Chairman during the Bush administration, has sug-
gested price caps as an alternative means of regulating prices. See Schreiber, supra note 12.
307 See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
308 See supra text accompanying note 299 (discussing rate of return, which is by defini-
tion fixed for any investment level).
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Price caps could function as a temporary measure during the
transition from monopoly wired local access to competitive wireless
access. One of the many advantages of wireless technology is that the
capital costs of serving rural customers are comparable to the costs of
serving urban customers. Whereas the cost of copper cable and
trenches increases by the foot, a radio transceiver costs the same in
Snow Shoe as it does in New York City. The ultimate goal, therefore,
is to encourage nationwide coverage of PCS and cellular networks.
CONCLUSION
Regulators in the telecommunications industry face difficult
choices in trying to simultaneously protect traditional regulatory goals
and encourage technological innovation. Despite uncertainty as to
the future structure of the industry, three fundamental regulatory
changes must be implemented before the telecommunications indus-
try, and the BOCs in particular, will be in a position to maximize pub-
lic welfare. First, Congress must remove the federal courts from the
regulatory process by exercising its broad power under the Commerce
Clause 30 9 to invalidate both the 1982 MFJ and the more recent AT&T-
McCaw Consent Decree. Second, Congress must grant the FCC the
authority necessary to eliminate rate-of-return pricing for local access
on an industry wide basis, and third, the FCC must establish price caps
for essential core services to protect rural customers during the period
of transition to wireless networks.
Finally, the FCC must resist the temptation to micromanage
emerging markets in the telecommunications industry. The techno-
logical possibilities of the industry are persuasive enough, and the po-
tential competitors sophisticated enough, to justify allowing the
market participants to bear the risks and rewards associated with new
development. The FCC should concentrate its efforts on safeguarding
the integrity of the telecommunications networks and protecting con-
sumers of core services who currently have no alternatives.
Robert B. Friedrich
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